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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The measurement of market power has been one of the prime concerns of industrial 
organization economists. Obviously it is important for practical reasons because it can 
frequently provide valuable information for the design of public policy towards monopoly 
and anti-competitive practices. As a result, during the past decades, many industrial 
economists have developed various approaches to measuring market power. 
Traditionally, SCP (structure-conduct-performance) researchers have relied heavily 
on the relationship between market performance and market structure as a way of making 
inferences about market power. But their smdies have not always been clearly based on a 
well-defined theoretical model. Alternatively, since the late 1970s, new empirical techniques 
have been developed to estimate market power using structiu^ models based on the 
neoclassical theory of a firm's behavior. Some of these methods make inferences about 
market power from a firm's or an industry's response to cost conditions. Others make such 
inferences from a firm's or an industry's response to variation in the elasticity of output 
demand, or by detecting multiple pricing regimes. However, most of these recent studies 
have been based on static optimization models. In particular, with regard to the 
determination of the capital input in oligopoly models, most previous empirical studies have 
specified investment behavior within either short-run or long-run equilibrium frameworks. 
For example, Roberts (1984) developed a short-run equilibrium model in a homogenous 
product oligopoly and estimated price-cost margins for the U.S. coffee roasting industry. 
Bernstein (1991) showed that there is significant oligopoly power for some Canadian 
industries producing multiple outputs, again using a short-run equilibrium approach. The 
common characteristic of these "short-run equilibrium" empirical models is that, while it is 
recognized that the capital input decision is not made in the same way as decisions about 
other factors, no explanation of the evolution of capital stocks is provided by the model. 
Capital is essentially exogenous. 
On the other hand, others have modeled firms" oligopolistic market behavior in the 
long-run equilibrium firamework, assuming all input factors, including capital, costlessly 
adjust without delay to satisfy marginal revenue product equals marginal factor cost 
conditions in every period. This class of model has been empirically implemented by 
.A.ppelbaum (1979) for the U.S. crude petroleum and natural gas industry, and Appelbaum 
(1982) for the U.S. rubber, textile, electrical machinery, and tobacco industries. Gollop and 
Roberts (1979) also developed a model that can identify the interdependent behavior among 
firms in an oligopolistic industry based on an assumption of long-run equilibrium. Capital is 
endogenous in these models. 
However, the standard long-run equilibrium assumption for the capital stock is often 
inappropriate where there are substantial adjustment costs' in capital accumulation, so that 
investment decisions are intertemporally made. Hence measures of market power based on 
models incorporating the long-run equilibrium assumption may not be very informative. As 
noted in Pindyck (1985), ignoring an intertemporal aspect of firms' decision problems may 
' Eisner and Stolz (1963) first introduced adjustment costs into the neoclassical theory of the 
firm in an effort to construct a dynamic framework capable of yielding a demand for 
investment. Later work by Bemdt, Fuss, and Waverman (1980) developed a dynamic model 
in which capital is quasi-fixed and subject to quadratic adjustment costs. 
lead to inferences of the extent of market power that are misleading. In this sense, the non­
competitive pricing behavior of firms needs also to be described in a model where a firm's 
optimal capital stock decisions are intertemporally made in the face of adjustment costs. 
Reflecting this view, Bernstein (1994) analyzed non-competitive pricing behavior in a 
dynamic cost of adjustment fi-amework and tested for the existence of price-margins in the 
Canadian softwood lumber industry. In a different approach, considering the intertemporal 
dependence between fims with respect to advertising expenditures. Roberts and Samuelson 
(1988) estimated "dynamic conjectural variations" for firms in the U.S. cigarette industry. 
Theoretical analyses of investment in imperfectly competitive industries have 
highlighted the strategic aspects of capital acquisition decisions. For example, strategic 
behavior in capital investment has been developed by Spence (1977. 1979), Dixit (1979. 
1980). Brander and Spencer (1983), and others. This class of studies examines firm behavior 
in dynamic games in which an irreversible commitment in capital investment in an early 
stage of the game enables a firm to favorably influence the market outcome in a subsequent 
stage. Empirically, the main body of the literature has tried only to capture preemptive 
behavior of a dominant firm to deter or to delay investment by rival firms (Reynolds. 1986; 
Gilbert and Lieberman. 1987; and Hall. 1990). This sort of strategic effect of capital 
investment has often been ignored, however, in NEIO empirical studies of market power. 
The objective of this dissertation is to measure the degree of market power within the 
context of each of three models; short-run, and long-run equilibrium models, and a dynamic 
cost of adjustment model with strategic capital investment; and to see how inferences of 
market power differ across the three cases. In particular, we will use the adjustment cost 
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model to study dynamic oligopolistic behavior of firms with strategic investment. This 
research builds on previous theoretical work as well as on our theoretical model developed in 
Chapter 3. and recent developments in applied econometrics. Our research presents an 
industry analysis of market structure and demonstrates the use of theor> -consistent models 
following the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) tradition. The models" 
differences in this dissertation center on the role of investment in capital (equipment and 
structures). First a short-run model is estimated in which demand for the non-capital inputs 
is conditioned on the existing capital stock but there is no explicit modeling of the demand 
for capital. Second, a long-nm model is estimated with no adjustment costs so that capital 
appears as any other input: Its employment level is determined each period by a marginal 
condition equating marginal revenue product with the factor's price. Third, a dynamic cost 
of adjustment model is estimated, which generalizes both the short- and long-run models: 
Inputs and outputs are chosen to maximize the expected present value of a future flow of 
revenues net of production and adjustment costs. Time-series data are used to reveal the 
degree of market power through a system of equations including a supply relation, a demand 
function and a set of input demand (capital, labor, and intermediate material inputs) flmctions 
for each model. 
This dissertation is organized into nine chapters. After introductory remarks in this 
Chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review of NEIO studies for measuring market power. 
including discussion of two classes of NEIO approaches and references to some relevant 
papers. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical rationale for the strategic investment behavior of 
non-competitive firms. First, theoretical studies on firm's strategic capital investment 
behavior in oligopoly models are reviewed. In particular. Chapter 3 analyzes the strategic 
capital investment behavior of firms within a simple duopoly model as in Brander and 
Spencer (1983). Then, it derives an illustrative strategic investment model by generalizing 
Brander and Spencer's results slightly by allowing for investment over time subject to 
convex adjustment costs. Chapter 4 develops a theoretical foimdation for measuring market 
power in the context of a dynamic cost-of-adjustment model with a strategic effect of capital 
investment and also makes clear its theoretical distinctions from the short-run and long-run 
static model specifications. Chapter 5 translates the theoretical models presented in Chapter 
4 into estimable models, and introduces the hypotheses to be tested. First, a fxmctional form 
will be selected. Next, the econometric specifications for three equilibrium models will be 
derived. Finally, some properties of the cost flmction in terms of industry-level variables will 
be discussed. Chapter 6 discusses the estimation methods. First, the statistical properties of 
Chapter 5"s model's equations are discussed. NL3SLS (non-linear three stage least squares) 
is suggested as an estimation method for the two static equilibrium models. In addition, 
following Schankerman and Nadiri (1986), a specification test will be proposed to see 
whether the long-run equilibrium model is consistent with the data. Finally, a methodology 
suggested by Hansen and Singleton (1982) is proposed for the estimation of the dynamic 
adjustment cost model. Chapter 7 provides some background information on the particular 
industry used as an application: The U.S. electrical transformer industry for the 1958-91 time 
period. Descriptions of the variables and sources of the data are also given here. Chapter 8 
discusses the empirical results for the U.S. transformer industry from the application of each 
of the empirical models. A summary is provided in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2. '^NEIO" APPROACH TO MEASUREVG MARKET POWER 
2.1 Introduction 
"Market power" refers to a divergence between price and marginal cost. NEIO 
studies for measuring market power can be broadly divided into static models and 
intenemporal models, each based on a different aspect of a firm's optimi2dng behavior. Both 
methods discussed in this chapter use the latest econometric techniques to estimate structural 
parameters and to test structural hypotheses. The static models reviewed in this chapter are 
concerned with pricing in oligopolistic industries without considering decision variables' 
intertemporal links between periods, while the intertemporal models focus more on such 
effects as dynamic optimizing and strategic behavior over time in measuring market power. 
For many decades, economists have conducted SCP studies that investigate the major 
factors determining market power. These analyses often involved regressing price-cost 
margins on market share, concentration ratios, barriers to entry, and other aspects of market 
structure using industry cross-sectional data. The attractiveness of this approach lies in its 
straightforwardness and its ability to produce some useful stylized facts. However, the 
approach has also been criticized on the basis of the data and methods used. Two important 
problems have been identified: First, many of these studies suffer from substantial 
measurement error or related statistical problems. Second, more importantly, most of these 
studies use ad hoc regression equations with no theoretical foundation so they rarely, if ever, 
yield consistent estimates of structural parameters. The NEIO is partly motivated by those 
criticisms of the SCP paradigm. The NEIO approach is based on the following central ideas: 
(i) economic marginal cost (MC) cannot be directly observed, so it should be estimated 
within the context of a theoretical model; (ii) institutional details of industries affect firms' 
conduct, so studies should focus on individual industries using time-series data; (iii) analysis 
should be conducted subject to restrictions implied by neoclassical theories of the optimizing 
firm and; (iv) as a result of the theory-consistent approach to empirical modeling, the 
particular mechanism responsible for the identification of market behavior is made clear. 
An example of a stylized NEIO model will serve to illustrate these characteristics. 
The dependent variables are market price, P„ and each firm's quantity, y,,. Throughout, i is 
used to index firms and t is used to index time periods. The inverse market demand fimction 
for the product is written as: 
(2.1)P, = D(Y„ z,, 5, 6 J, 
where Y, is aggregate industry output (i.e., Y, = I!,yj„). z, is a vector of variables shifting 
demand, 5 is a vector of unknown parameters of the demand fimction, and EJ, is an error term. 
The total cost fimction for the ith firm is given by: 
(2.2) C, = C(y„W,.R,„ T, s J, 
where Wj, is the vector of factor prices paid by firm i at observation t, R^, consists of other 
variables that shift cost, T is a vector of unknown parameters, and the e^j, are error terms. 
The definition of marginal cost follows from (2.2): 
(2.3)MC = C/y„W„ R,,, T, E J. 
where the subscript denotes partial differentiation. A range of oligopoly conduct can be 
described by general supply relations: 
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(2.4) P, = Cy(y„, W„, R,,, r. e,.,) - DyCY,, z,, 5. ej Y,Q„. 
Since P, + DyY is monopoly marginal revenue (MR). (2.4) has the interpretation of marginal 
cost (MC) = "perceived" MR for oligopoly models. The parameters 0j, index the 
competitiveness of oligopoly conduct. As 0j„ a positive unknown parameter, moves farther 
from 0 to 1, the conduct of firm i moves farther from that of a perfect competitor and closer 
to monopoly. Marginal cost in (2.4) appears as a fimction of unknown parameters, not as an 
accounting datum. Only after F has been estimated can MC be calculated. If (2.1) and (2.4) 
are solved simultaneously for all firms, they yield the reduced forms for price and each firm's 
quantity: 
(2.5) P, = P*( W„ z,, Q, e j ,  
(2.5') y„= y*( W,. R,, z,. Q. e,), 
where Q = (5. F. 0 ) is the vector of all parameters, is the vector of all structural error 
terms, and W, and R, incorporate all of the W,, and R^, respectively. 
The advantages of the model in (2.1) and (2.4) are three-fold. First, the econometric 
approach is structural so that each parameter has an economic interpretation. Second, since 
conventional oligopoly solution concepts (e.g., price taking equilibrium, Coumot-Nash, joint-
profit maximization) imply specific values for the 0s, estimates can be directly linked to 
theoretical notions of firm and industry conduct. Third, given the structural nature of the 
econometrics, the reason why the data identify the conduct parameters can be made clear. 
As shown above, in a departure from the SCP traditions, NEIO has been firmly 
grounded on the neoclassical non-competitive theory to construct explicit structural models, 
and. it uses the latest econometric techniques to estimate structural parameters and to test 
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structural hypotheses. Empirically, they have been explored within both static and 
intertemporal frameworks. 
2.2 Static models 
The basic approach of the static models discussed in this dissertation is to treat a 
given vector of observed industry prices and outputs as the outcomes of static optimizing 
behavior and to evaluate what type of non-competitive behaviors among firms would have 
occurred to generate those prices and output as an equilibrium outcome. Most of them 
involve parameterizing the marginal revenue ftmction of a firm in an industry, and measuring 
the extent to which observed price exceeds marginal revenue at observed outputs. 
In what follows, three broad approaches to the static models of market structure are 
summarized. One method is to test whether firms are price takers or not by way of 
estimating a marginal cost function and then detecting differences between marginal costs 
and prices at observed outputs. Using relatively easily accessible data; for example, input 
and output prices and quantities; one can jointly estimate the parameters of a production or 
cost function and a marginal revenue curve, and then test to see whether the latter is flat. 
Starting with Rosse (1970), earlier studies rejected price-taking behavior: Appelbaum (1979) 
for the U.S. petroleum and natural gas industry; Baker and Bresnahan (1985) and (1986) for 
two leading firms in the U.S. beer industry. On the other hand, some other empirical works 
attempted to investigate pricing conduct of firms without imposing a priori structure on the 
data in the form of assumptions on functional forms. For example. Hall (1988) showed that 
with an assumption of constant returns to scale in an industry, shifts in cost are sufficient to 
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identify market power. Shapiro (1987) and Domowitz et al. (1986. 1988) and others used 
methods similar to Hall's and found significant markups for U.S. manufacturing industries. 
For more detailed analysis of industry conduct, conjectural variation (the expected 
change in rival's output consequent upon a change in the output of firm i) methods have 
focused on parameterizing various oligopoly solution concepts. The implication is that if one 
were to estimate an arbitrary set of conjectures, then one can compare them to values 
suggested by the different oligopoly models which are computable given knowledge of costs 
and demands. Starting with Iwata (1974) for the Japanese flat glass industry, more elaborate 
work has been done by Gollop and Roberts (1979), who attempted to estimate a pattern of 
conjectural variations* across rival firms for the U.S. coffee roasting industry, and followed 
by others (Roberts, 1984; Spiller and Favaro, 1984; Slade, 1987). However, in a sense, those 
studies are descriptions of the consequences of pricing conduct rather than descriptions of 
conduct itself These kinds of concerns have led to development of models allowing for 
systematic conduct over time. This last group of works^ is involved in not only testing 
whether the conduct is stable, but also developing models capable of explaining price wars, 
cartel formation, pricing behavior over the business cycle, and so on. For example, research 
on the Joint Executive Committee, a cartel controlling railroad freight shipments fi-om the 
" An alternative way to get the same goal is to estimate "conjectural variation elasticity" as in 
Appelbaum (1982) and Geroski (1983). 
^ This group is sometimes classified as "multi-period models of collusive behavior" because 
it deals with describing variation of behavior over several time periods. We include this type 
among the static models in this literature review because it does not model any explicitly 
dynamic optimization problem. 
i 
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east coast of the U.S. in the 1880s, showed a systematic pattern of alternating cooperative and 
non-cooperative pricing behavior (e.g.. Porter, 1983, 1985; and Lee and Porter. 1984). 
Simiarly, Spiller and Favaro (1984) observed major changes in behavior of the Uruguayan 
banking sector following the relaxation of legal entry barriers. 
Table 1 reports the estimated price-cost margins, expressed as the price-cost gap as a 
proportion of price, from several different NEIO studies for various industries. 
Table 1 
Some results of published works oo measuring market power 
Author Industry The estimated price-cost margin 
Bresnahan (1981) Autos (1970s) 0.1-0.34" 
Appelbaum (1982) Rubber 0.049" 
Textile 0.072" 
Electrical machinery 0.198" 
Tobacco 0.648" 
Porter (1983) Railroads 0.40' 
Lopez(1984) Food processing 0.50 
Roberts (1984) Coffee roasting 0.055/0.025" 
Spiller and Favaro (1984) Banks "before"® 0.88/0.21' 
Banks "after"® 0.40/0.16' 
Suslow (1986) Aluminum (interwar) 0.59 
Slade (1987) Retail gasoline 0.10 
Karp and Perloff (1989) Rice exports 0.11 
Varies by type of car; larger in standard, luxury segment. 
^ At sample midpoint. 
' When cartel was succeeding: 0 in reversionary p>eriods. 
Largest and second largest firm, respectively. 
' Uruguayan banks before and after entry deregulation. 
^ Large firm group / small firm group. 
Source: Articles cited and Bresnahan (1989). 
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2.3 Intertemporal models 
It can be argued that the NEIO models introduced so far have tried to capture in a 
static world what is really a dynamic problem of firms. An intertemporal model is suggested 
when one takes account of planning by firms over many periods. For example, when there 
are large adjustment costs in accumulating capital, actions in one period would be expected 
to affect the costs and profits in later periods. The typical model is characterized by 
maximizing the discounted flow of funds over a finite or infinite horizon when decisions are 
made intertemporally. 
In the intertemporal model, firms may take into account more strategies and 
expectations over rivals' decisions during the time periods and, hence, behavior may involve 
more than just a current period reaction to current changes of rivals' decisions. Thus the 
implications associated with dynamic decision-making in an oligopoly model can have a 
significant effect on market performance. 
Pindyck (1985) noted that intertemporal constraints on production and price, in such 
cases as learning curves, exhaustible resources, and dynamic demand functions, would affect 
the extent of market power. Roberts and Samuelson (1988) developed a dynamic model of 
advertising competition in an oligopolistic industry,^ incorporating dynamic conjectural 
variations to account for the intertemporal links created by the durability of advertising. 
They rejected the hypothesis that the U.S. cigarette market is competitive, and suggested that 
* Friedman (1983) and Fershtman (1984) provided dynamic model of oligopolistic 
advertising competition with an intertemporal dependence structure. 
J 
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firms in the industry act as if their choices would alter the future choices of rival firms. Karp 
and Perloff (1989. 1993) used a dynamic oligopoly model with costly adjustment of 
production or inventories to estimate the degree of competition for the international coffee 
and the international rice export markets. Bernstein (1994) developed a dynamic model with 
multiple products incorporating price-cost margins in domestic and export markets for the 
Canadian softwood lumber industry. He suggested that competitive behavior occurred in 
both markets by testing the estimates of price-cost margins. The intertemporal nature of the 
model arises fi-om the existence of adjustment costs associated with the capital input. 
To this point, all of the specifications in the empirical dynamic NEIO models have 
represented the capital investment decision of firms as being undertaken, either implicitly or 
explicitly, fi^om a naive perspective; i.e., overlooking the incentives for strategic behavior 
arising when firms engage in a capital investment game over time. As extensively noted in 
theoretical literature on oligopoly behavior, inclusion of capital stocks not only gives a firm 
control over its cost flmction intertemporally,' but also opens up the possibility of its strategic 
use of capital stocks to its favor by influencing the market environment in future time 
periods. Hence, the firm will be able to influence the market outcome through its choice of 
capital stock. Therefore, it is reasonably argued that mistakenly omitting strategic effects of 
capital investment from empirical oligopoly models would make the measures of the degree 
of market power misleading or biased. 
' Friedman (1982) presented several formulations that relate a firm's marginal cost to its 
capital stock, and suggested that in any of those cases, capital decisions provide a structural 
link between time periods, as would be the case, for example, when a large adjustment cost is 
incurred with capital stock changes. 
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In the next two chapters, we will construct an illustrative theoretical model 
emphasizing the strategic role of capital investment in an oligopoly market (Chapter 3). and 
then set up the theoretical foundation for a comprehensive empirical analysis of market 
power within the context of a dynamic model (Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 3. AN ILLUSTRATIVE TWO-PERIOD DUOPOLY MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and examine a two-period duopoly model of 
strategic investment behavior by imperfectly competitive firms. .Mthough the model of this 
chapter is very simple, it will yield insights about the strategic role of capital investment that 
will help in the formulation of the dynamic cost of adjustment model in the chapters to 
follow. 
Industrial organization deals with strategic interactions of firms. One broad categor>' 
of 1.0. studies examines firm behavior in dynamic games in which an irreversible 
commitment in an early stage of the game enables a firm to favorably influence the market 
outcome in a subsequent stage. Examples of these works (and the nature of the commitment 
variable in each) include Schmalensee (1978, brand introduction), Gilbert and Newbery 
(1982, investment in R&D), and Schmalensee (1983, investment in advertising). Beginning 
with Spence (1977, 1979) and Dixit (1979, 1980), a long series of papers has explored the 
strategic use of irreversible investment in capital stock. 
One such strategic investment model is due to Brander and Spencer (1983). It 
explains the role of capital in an imperfectly competitive market in which firms' equilibrium 
outputs depend on their own and their rivals' marginal costs. If firms recognize this 
dependence of market share on marginal cost, and capital investment expenditures occur 
before the output is produced, firms might be tempted to shift additional resources to the 
overhead or "sunk" category so as to reduce marginal costs and gain a strategic advantage in 
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the imperfectly competitive output game. In other words, when business firms can commit to 
cost-reducing investments before production and sales take place, they may use these capital 
investments strategically rather than simply to minimize cost. Brander and Spencer use a 
simple, symmetric, two-stage Nash duopoly model to show that such strategic use of capital 
will increase total investment, and total output, and lower industry profit.^ 
In the Brander and Spencer model, all investment is made, irreversibly, prior to the 
realization of output. In our study, we generalize Brander and Spencer's results slightly by 
allowing for investment over time. Some investment is made contemporaneously with the 
output decision in our model's second period. But an assumption of convex adjustment costs 
creates an incentive to spread investment across periods. In particular, firms will want to 
gradually build toward their ultimate capital stock with capital acquisition in the model's first 
period as well as the second. As in Brander and Spencer, the strategic role of first period 
investment stems from two features; investment is irreversible and first period investment has 
an influence on firms' objective functions in the second stage. Thus, firms' decisions about 
first period investment will affect the Nash equilibrium in the second stage choose-quantity-
and-capital game. 
Section 3.2 briefly reviews the assumptions and results of the Brander and Spencer 
model. Section 3.3 presents our extension of their model and derives same analytical results 
preliminary to the paper's main findings. In section 3.4, our model's extensions of Brander 
' In the Brander and Spencer model, firms affect marginal costs of production with 
expenditures on cost-reducing R&D. But, as they note, there is nothing that formally 
distinguishes this case from investment in capital stock. 
17 
and Spencer's results are presented in the form of four propositions. Section 3.5 provides a 
brief sununary and conclusion. 
3.2. Overview of the Brander and Spencer model 
The model with strategic capital investment involves a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, firms choose capital investment levels. These are made known then, in the second 
stage, output levels are determined. It is assumed that for any given capital investment 
levels, firms correctly anticipate the output equilibrium, which is resolved as a Nash quantity' 
game. The solution concept in the first stage game in capital investment levels is also Nash, 
with the overall result being a "subgame perfect equilibrium" in the two stage game. 
Firm i, for i = I and 2, has output qj, revenue R' and cost C. Expenditure on capital 
investment is denoted K,, and this initial expenditiure is converted to a flow by an implicit 
"rental" rate V|. Thus the profit flow of firm i is given by 
(3.1) n'(q„ q,; K,) = R'(q„ q.) - C(qr, K,) - v^K,, 
The outputs q, and q, are substitutes in the sense that increasing the output of good j 
decreases the total and marginal revenue of firm i. Using subscripts to denote derivatives, 
these conditions are expressed as 
The variable cost (C) includes all costs except capital investment. The effect of 
having undertaken more variable cost-reducing capital investment is to reduce C, given q;. 
However, the rate of decrease is assumed to decline (in absolute value) as K, increases. 
Marginal cost is strictly positive and decreasing in K,: 
(3.3) CUqi. fs) < 0; C-KiKiCqi, K,) > 0; C^(q„ BC.) > 0; < 0-
Given capital investment levels K, and K,. chosen by firms in stage 1. output levels, 
q, and q,, are determined in stage 2 as the solution to a Nash quantity game. The solutions to 
the second-stage game can be represented as 
(3.4) q' = q'(K„ K,) and q" = q'(K,, K,). 
Using the second order conditions for the firms' profit maximization problems in stage 2. and 
using conditions that insure stability of equilibrium in the dynamic model that results when a 
natural adjustment process is appended to the static reaction fimction model. Brander and 
Spencer establish the following properties of the q'(*) fimctions: 
(3.5) dq'/dK, > 0 and dq;/d¥Li < 0. 
In words, an increase in firm i's capital investment leads to an increase in the second stage 
equilibrium output for firm i and a decrease in the second stage equilibrium output for firm j. 
The intuition of this result is illustrated in Figure 1. By increasing its capital, firm 1 reduces 
its marginal cost. This increases its profit maximizing output response to any given output 
on the part of firm 2; that is, it shifts firm 1 's reaction function outward. The result can be 
seen in Figure I as an increase in equilibrium q, and a decrease in equilibrium q,. 
Solution of the first stage of the game proceeds by substituting the q'(*) and q-(») 
fimctions into firms' profit fimctions and then solving for a Nash equilibrium in capital 
investment levels. Brander and Spencer show that the equilibrium investment levels in the 
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reaction function: firm 1 (shifts out as K, increases) 
reaction flmction: firm 2 
Figure 1. Effect of an increase in capital investment on output equilibrium in the Brander and 
Spencer model 
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subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are larger than the investment levels that would minimize 
the total cost of production for the equilibrium output levels. The intuition of this result is 
that the "strategic role of capital" (that is. the ability of firms to use capital investment to 
influence the second-stage equilibrium of the game in a manner that is favorable to the 
investing firm) provides each firm with an incentive to "overinvest" in capital. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage game described above is referred to 
by Brander and Spencer as the model's "strategic equilibriimi." They compare it to a "non-
sUrategic equilibrium" in which firms make no use of capital's strategic role. This is best 
thought of as a Nash equilibrium in a one-stage game in which capital and output are 
simultaneously chosen. Brander and Spencer derive the following results for the symmetric 
firm case: 
In the strategic equilibrium: 
i. total investment is greater than in the non-strategic equilibrium. 
ii. output is greater than in the non-strategic equilibrium. 
iii. each firm earns less profit than in the non-strategic equilibrium. 
Result iii. shows a similarity between the Brander and Spencer model, and the classic 
Prisoner's Dilemma. A firm that unilaterally ignores capital's strategic role will be 
victimized by a rival who strategically "overinvests" in capital in order to influence the 
outcome in the second stage Nash quantity game. But when both firms invest strategically, 
both experience lower profits than they would have in the naive, non-strategic equilibrium of 
the model. 
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Because the Nash-in-quantities duopoly equilibrium of stage two is imperfectly 
competitive (involving price above marginal cost), result ii shows that the strategic use of 
capital has the potential for being welfare-improving. If result iii's impact on profits is not 
too great, overall welfare could be greater in the strategic equilibriimi than in the non-
strategic equilibrium. Brander and Spencer also establish conditions on cost and revenue 
functions which insure that capital's strategic use will increase welfare. 
3.3. The model of strategic capital investment with adjustment costs 
In this section, we present our extension of the Brander and Spencer model. As in 
Brander and Spencer, two firms choose capital investment and output in a two-period model. 
Each firm chooses some level of irreversible capital investment in period 1. The first 
period's decisions are observed before the second period in which both output and additional 
capital investment are simultaneously chosen. Capital investment is subject to convex 
adjustment costs which, along with capital acquisition costs, are incurred in each period. 
Variable cost is incurred and revenue is realized in period 2. Note that production and sales 
are assumed to occur only in the second period. This assumption is made only to simplify 
the analysis: Qualitatively similar results would probably emerge from a model with first 
period production, too. However, even our simple model does incorporate the essential 
feature of convex adjustment costs: Firms have an incentive to build toward a target capital 
stock gradually over time. 
The two firms are denoted 1 and 2 (or, if i denotes 1. then j represents 2 and vice 
versa). Each firm i produces output q' at variable cost C. which includes all costs except 
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capital acquisition and adjustment costs, and earns revenue R'. Capital investment in period 
1 is denoted Kj and denotes the ultimate capital stock. The purchase price of one unit of 
capital is w^. In period 1, firm i incurs acquisition cost w^K,, and adjustment cost which is 
d 
assumed to be quadratic in net investment, where d is an adjustment cost parameter 
satisfying d > 0. In period 2. firms choose output qj, and final capital stock, Kj > K, 
incurring additional capital acquisition costs, w^-^Kj - Kj j and additional adjustment costs, 
d ~ , 
—(K, - K.,)". Total capital acquisition cost for both periods is w^-Kj. 
The variable production cost function is C'(qj, BC^). Marginal cost of output is 
increasing in output and decreasing in capital investment. The effect of an increase in cost-
reducing capital investment is to reduce variable cost, given output, wdth the rate of decrease 
declining (in absolute value) as capital investment increases. Using subscripts to denote 
derivatives, these conditions are summarized as: 
Cj (qi, K,) >0, c;,  (Qi,  K|) >0, Cl;,(qi, K,) <0, Ci;,K,(qi, K,) >0, 
Ci.K.t lh Ki)  <0.fori= 1,2.  
The revenues are assumed to depend on a firm's output and its rival's output. We 
assume that marginal revenues are decreasing in ovra outputs. Increases in the output of one 
good decrease the total and marginal revenue of the other. These conditions imply the 
following properties: 
(qi 'q2)<0- R-q,(qi .q2)<0'  Rqiq,(qi 'q2)<0'  fori  = i ,2andi?i j .  
Profit 7c' of firm i is then given by 
(3.6) 7i'(q„ cb, K,, K,) = R'(q„ q,) - w^K. - C(q., K,) - jCBC. - K, )* - ^ Kf 
Looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium' leads one to solve the stages by backward 
induction. Given the first period capital investment levels, K, and K,. the ith firm will 
choose q; and Ki > K; to maximize n'(q„ q^, K^, Kj) taking q, as given. Assuming both 
firms" solutions are interior solutions in the sense that Kj > Kj (and qj > 0), the Nash 
equilibrium values for the second period choices, q; and K^, are described by first order 
conditions:® 
(3.7) 7r; = R; (q„q,)-C|, (qj.Ki) = 0, i = 1 and 2. 
(3.8) 71'^ = - C-, (qi,Ki) - d(Kj -K,) =0, i = I and 2. 
Condition (3.7) says that, at the profit-maximizing choice of output, marginal revenue must 
equal marginal cost, given the total capital investment over the two periods. Rearranging the 
The firms in our model are assumed to behave optimally (i.e., maximizing their profits) on 
the equilibrium path at each stage given rivals' strategies. Therefore firms in the equilibrium 
do not have the incentives to deviate fi-om their strategies unilaterally. 
® The assumptions made to this point are not sufficient to insure an interior solution. The 
intuition is as follows: If d were equal to zero, firms would face no incentive to smooth 
investment over time so the "strategic effect" (See the discussion accompanying equation 
(3.21) and Section 3.4's Proposition I.) would induce firms to undertake all investment in the 
first period. On the other hand, with significant adjustment costs, firms would have an 
incentive to postpone a significant potion of their investment until the second period in order 
to economize on adjustment costs. As positive d approaches zero, the character of the 
optimum will jump discontinuously, at some point, fi*om a roughly even distribution of 
investment across periods to a concentration of all investment in period 1. We assume that d 
is sufficiently large so that the local optimum, characterized by equations (3.7) and (3.8), is 
also a global optimum. That is, we assume that the optimal pattern of investment involves 
strictly positive investment in period 2 as well as in period 1. 
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first order condition for capital investment (3.8) gives 
WK + d(K, -  Kj) = - (q j, Kj) ,  which implies that  marginal  acquisi t ion cost  plus marginal  
adjustment cost of an extra unit of capital equals the marginal savings in variable production 
cost. Second order sufficient conditions for strict global profit maxima in the second stage 
decision problems are, 
(3.9) -Cj„ <0. 7I'K,K,  =-CL,K,  -d<0.and 
The first two conditions are guaranteed by previous assumptions. The third is an additional 
assumption. The second period Nash equilibrium values for output and capital are obtained 
by simultaneous solution of (3.7) and (3.8) for i = 1 and 2. These optimal choices of qj and 
K, for firm i depend on the levels of capital investment in period 1, K, and K,. and can be 
written as 
(3.10) q' = q'(K,,K2); 
K'  = K'(K,,K2) fori  = 1 and2.  
We seek additional reasonable restrictions for the static model by requiring stability 
of the dynamic model that results when a natural adjustment mechanism is incorporated 
(Dixit (1986)). Firms are assumed to adjust their second period decision variables in the 
direction of greater profit at a rate which is proponional to the magnitude of marginal profit. 
This leads to the following dynamic system: 
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(3.11) 
q '  =Si7t;  (q, .q, .Ki.K,  )  ;  
) ' fori= land2.  
where superscripts denote time derivatives and the parameters s, and 0, > 0 are speeds of 
adjustment. Linearizing the system (3.11) about an equilibrium point, (q*. K*). for i = 1. 2. 
we have 
n V • ^ 0  M q i - q .  
0  i  K , - k ;  
q2 -q2 
y K . - K ' j  
The necessary condition for stability of the dynamic system is that all of the eigenvalues of 
the coefficient matrix be negative in a neighborhood of equilibrium. For this to hold for all s, 
and 0j > 0. the matrix A. 
Sl^q .K, Sl^i,q: 
0 
42 0 S2<q. 
^ 0 0 
^i,q. ^ 
T: 111. 
0 
1 
qiK, 
_1 
qifl: 0 
1 
K,K, 0 0 
0 
^1^2 
0 
must be negative definite in a neighborhood of equilibrium. Thus the principal minors of 
order i (i = 1, 2. 3,4) all have sign (-1)'. In particular, the determinant of A is positive. 
The variables K,, K,, q,, q,, K,, and K, are all jointly determined endogenous 
variables. But  i t  wil l  be instruct ive to see how second period Nash equil ibrium values for  q, .  
q,. K,, and K, change as first period investment levels change.' Totally differentiate (3.7), 
'Imagine ic, and jc, being manipulated in an artificial experiment, for example. 
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and (3.8) with respect to K, to obtain the 4x4 simultaneous equation system: 
f aq, 
/ I 
c 
I 
(3.12) 
^q.q, 
^q.K, ^ K , K ,  
izqi  
0 
0 
0 ^q,K, y 
aK, 
aK, 
aR, 
aq, 
aK, 
aK, 
d K j  
^ 0 ^  
-d 
0 
v O y  
Applying Cramers rule to (3.12). we get 
aq, (3.13) ^ = -) *> / *> 7t: „ 711-r- -\n: 
aK, detA / 
which is positive because d, det A. )") 
positive (the last by the second order sufficient condition for profit maximization). 
Another application of Cramer's rule to equation (3.12) yields 
0Q •> d I (3.14) = --—— TtK,K,^qiq,^q,K,' which is negative because, in addition to signs noted 
dls.1 QCt A 
above, we have ^ < 0 by (3.9) and < 0. 
Similarly, totally differentiating equation (3.7) and (3.8) with respect to K, and solving by 
Cramer's rule yields 
(3.15) 
aKj detA 
(3.16) aq.  TtLir .TT'  <0.  
aK, detA 
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Equations (3.13) through (3.16) tell us that firm i's Nash equilibrium level of output 
is increasing in its own first-period capital investment and decreasing in the rival s first-
period capital investment. The effect of one firm's period 1 investment on industrv' output is 
given by 
whose sign is ambiguous, because the sign of the square bracket term of the equation (3.17) 
is not determined. But. for the symmetric case, the sign will be shown later to be 
positive. 
5K Equation (3.12) can also be solved for Generalizing to i = 1 or 2 we have 
5K, 
dK: d (3.18)^ = -
aKj detAl 
Since the term in square bracket of the equation (3.18) is a third order principal minor of A. 
the stability conditions require it to be negative. The sign of (3.18) is therefore positive. 
Likewise, the effect of Kj on the rival's total capital investment is 
d i  .  (3.19) = nj. I'Tii.Ti'L' <0 
dKi detA 
The results in equations (3.18) and (3.19) show that an increase in capital investment for firm 
i in period 1 increases its total capital investment but reduces its rival's total capital 
investment for the two periods combined. 
Strategic firms are aware of the dependence of output and capital investment 
decisions in the second period on capital investment in the first period. Now, to solve for the 
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first period Nash equilibrium in the strategic model, we substitute (3.10) into (3.6) and write 
the profit functions as functions of capital investments in the first period: 
(3.20) g'(K,,K2) = 7r'(q,(K,,K2),q2(K„K2),Ki(K,,K2),Ki).for i= 1,2. 
From equation (3.20), assuming an interior optimum, the first-order conditions for a profit-
maximizing choice of Kj, given Kj, are 
(3.21)g^KpK2) = <^ + 7r | ,^^ + Tt ' ,_^-H4 =0,fori  = l ,2 andi^j .  
This implies ^ (because Tt^ = =0 by the envelope theorem). 
This result can be decomposed into two effects. The direct effect, n ~ . would exist even if 
firm i's investment in period I were not observed by firm j before the choice of qj, and 
therefore could not affect q^. The strategic effect, tc' —=r-, results firom the influence of the 
' & q, 
first period investment on firm j's second period action. 
We also have the second-order sufficient conditions for a strict local maximum which 
take the form: 
(3.22) gL_-(K„K2)<0, fori = 1,2. 
Again adding the standard dynamic adjustment process leads to the following, 
(3.23) Kj = S j g j j  (k, ,  Kj)  fori= 1,2 where S j>0. 
Taking linear approximations around an equilibrium point [k|, Kj) yields 
29 
n iA\ f  1  _ f  V^i  ~ 
~ ^ ~ 2 2 ? ?* VK,/  l^2gK,K, ^2gK,Rj^K:2-K2>'  
As before, the stability condition for the reaction function equilibrium for the model is that 
the coefficient matrix should have negative eigenvalues. Necessary conditions for this to 
hold for all positive s, and include the second order sufficient conditions for a strict local 
solution of equations (3.21) for i = 1 and 2. Substituting these into the functions (3.10) yields 
strategic optimal  values for  qj ,  and K,:  
Several results proved in the next section examine capital's strategic role through a 
comparison of the strategic equilibrium with the model's "non-strategic" equilibrium wherein 
first-period investment is not used to influence the outcome of the second period Nash 
quantity and investment game. This equilibrium is best thought of as the solution for a 
version of the model in which the rival's first period investment is not observed before 
second period choices are made or, equivalently, in which firm i chooses Kj, qj, and Kj 
maximum, gL j: and < 0 as well as: 
To summarize, the "strategic" equilibrium for the model is determined as follows. 
Optimal values for K, and denoted by Kf and K,. are determined by simultaneous 
(3.26) qf =qj(Kf.Kf); 
Kf = Ki(Kf.K^) fori  = 1 and2.  
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simultaneously in a Nash game with firm j. Nonstrategic equilibrium values, identified by 
•'N" superscripts are simultaneously determined by the first-order conditions below. 
(3.27) 7t;.(q^,q2^K:^K^) = 0 
<(q.^q2^K^K^) = 0 
4(q^q^K^K3^) = 0 
trN X _  n Wl ^^2 * 2  •  2 '  — 
7: | ._(q,^q^K^K,^) = 0 
4jqr .q^K^.K,^)  = 0 
Note that the first four of these are the equations determining qf, and Kf, for i = 1 and 2. 
except that replaces Kf. So we also have the results. 
(3.28)qi ' '=qi(K^K,^);  
K,^' = Ki(K,\ K,^) for i = 1 and 2, 
where q^*) and Kj(«) are the same ftinctions appearing in (3.10).'° 
3.4. Results 
We present our model's extensions of Brander and Spencer's results in this section. 
'"The interpretation of equations (3.28) is slightly different, however, than that of their 
counterparts for the strategic equilibrium. In that case, they prescribed Nash equilibrium 
values for qj and K^, i = 1 and 2, given K, and Ki chosen in a previous stage. In the non-
strategic equilibrium, all six decision variables are chosen simultaneously. Equations (3.28) 
merely state some relationships that must be satisfied by equilibrium values. 
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The first Proposition shows that the strategic use of capital leads to "overinvestment" in a 
specific sense. Subsequently. Propositions 2. 3. and 4 establish some comparisons between 
the model's strategic and non-strategic equilibria in the case of symmetric firms. 
Proposition 1: For a given total amount of capital investment for firm i, strategic 
behavior induces the firm to use more capital investment in the first period. K. j. than the 
amount that would minimize adjustment costs. 
Proof: Adjustment cost-minimizing capital investment in the first period, Kj. for given 
K, = Kf.  is  the solut ion to Ttj ; :  =  d(Kf -  Kj) -  dKj = 0 yielding Kj = Kf /2 .  
Note that tc ^ = -2d < 0. 
However, strategic capital investment in period 1, Kf. satisfies (3.21) so that 
5qj  5q.  
TTf =  -7i '  <0,  because n' = R' < 0 by our model's assumption and < 0 bv K, q, q, q, ^ 
(3.14) or (3.16). Because the profit function is locally concave in K: (i.e., 7r'r= r: <0). this KjK, 
requires Kf > Kf /2, which meeins that the strategic capital investment level exceeds the 
adjustment cost minimizing investment level in period 1. O.E.D. 
Proposition 2: Assuming symmetry," each firm undertakes more period 1 capital 
investment in the strategic equilibrium than in the non-strategic equilibrium. 
"Symmetry means that firms face symmetric revenue and cost flmctions leading to the result 
that they have identical equilibrium levels of output and first-period and overall capital 
investment. 
Proof: Applying Taylor's theorem to the marginal profit functions, gj, (k, .KT). from (3.21) 
there exists a point, on the line segment connecting (Kf. K,) and ^K{^. ) such 
that 
g U K f . K ! ) - g U K r - K ? )  =  
8'r,k, (k: . K; )(Kf - Kr) + gL s jKJ. K;)(K| - K?). 
Likewise. 
g5jKf.K)-gijKr,K,~) = 
8iK,(K;-K;)(Kf-Kr)+gb,(K;.K;)(K^Kr).  
Rewrite (3.29) as Ag~ = g - ^  (*)AK, + gj^ for i = 1 and 2 
where Agj. = g^^ (Kf,K^)-gi. (k^K^).  AKJ = Rf -K|^ and the denotes evaluat ion 
of the function at Kj). Solving (3.29) simultaneously yields 
(3.30) AK, ^Aglgi-W-AgigLi, (.))/D.fori = I.2. 
where D = [g^ j^(.)g?^jJ.)-g^^(.)g-^ (.)]>0 by(3.25)." 
Adding up the equation (3.30) for i = 1 and 2, yields 
(3.31) AK, +AK2 = (s b: (•) - sb, (•)HR, + (sb, (•) - 8'K,K= WKi Id 
Here, and in similar applications of this technique in Proposition 3 and 4, we are assuming 
that the stability condition of (3.25) holds in a neighborhood of (Kf, Kj) sufficiently large to 
include (k, .  K.2).  
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By symmetry, (^) = g^^j. (*). {*) = {*) < 0 where the inequalit>- is due to 
(3.22). Also, referring to the second-order sufficient conditions in (3.25), we have 
Sr,C.(*)| sothat 
(3.32) (gg i; (*)~8lc,K for i = 1 and 2, where] ^ i. 
Now rearranging the right-hand side of the equation (3.29) reduces to 
AgR^ =g'K,(Kf,  K^j-g^jK^,  K3^) = -g | , jK^ K^),because gL (Kf,K^) = 0 by the 
definition of Kf . Also 
r t '  TT' (,  . . i  ( N  N  r r N  8K ,1^1 -^2 ; = '^q, lqi  ' Q Z  'K. ,  .K,  j^  + ^ q, lqi  'q2 -K- I  - ^ 2  ) -
(3.33) + TCL.(qr,q?- (q^^^2 • - ^2) 
tri  (r,^ fcrN i rN\^j  pi  
where the second equality sign follows firom the envelop theorem (using the relations in 
(3.27)) and die inequality uses < 0 from our model's assumption and (3.9) or (3.11). As 
a result, the equation (3.29) turns out to be Ag^ = -gi; (k[^, j < 0. 
Returning to (3.31) and using the result from (3.32), it follows that AK, + AK-, > 0 which 
implies AK,, AK, > 0 by the symmetry condition. Therefore we have 
Kf > KN for i = 1 and 2. Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 3: Assuming symmetry, firm i's total output and total capital investment 
(throughout the two periods) are larger in the strategic equilibrium than in the non-strategic 
equilibrium. 
Proof: By Taylor's theorem, there exists a point ^K*, Ki j on the line segment connecting 
(Kf.K^) and (Kf'.K?) such that 
(3.34) =(Kf-Kr)^(K;,K;)- .^(K;,K;)  =q?-q?-
by the symmetry assumption. 
Likewise, there exists a point Kj) on the line segment connecting ^Kf, K2) and 
(Kf'.K^) such that 
(3.35) K^-Kf =(Kf-Kf) g(K:, ic;K|^(K;.K;)  = K^-K^'  
By Proposition 2, j > 0. The remaining problem is to sign the terms in square 
brackets in (3.34) and (3.35). For simplicity, the A matrix as defined on page 25 can be 
expressed in the symmetric case as: 
A = 
^q.q. ^q.fC. ^qiq; 0 a P y 0" 
0 0 3 5 0 0 
^q:qi 0 4q= "Is, Y 0 a P 
0 0 0 0 P 5 
where a, p, y, and 5 are defined in the obvious way. 
By recalling (3.17). (3.18) and (3.19) with symmetry, we have 
To determine the signs of (3.36) and (3.37), we rely on the stability condition discussed on 
page 25. In particular, the determinant of A must be positive. Thus it follows that 
(3.38) (a6-p^] -y"5^ =(a5-p~ -y5)(a5-p" +y5) >0. 
Now a5 - p" > 0 and 5 < 0 by (3.9), and y = < 0 as assimied in our model. 
so we have (a5 - P~ + y5) > 0. But then (3.38) implies that 
(3.39) (a5 - p-- yS) > 0. 
The stability condition in page 25 also requires that the second order principal minor of A 
involving that the first and third columns and rows be positive: (a* - y^) > 0. So |aj > |y|. 
But we know a = < 0 by (3.9), hence 
(3.40) (a + y)<0 
Combining (3.39) and (3.40) with d > 0, det A > 0, and p = > 0, we can determine the 
signs of square brackets in (3.34) and (3.35) to be positive, therefore, the equation, (3.34) and 
(3.35). are positive respectively. Q.E.D. 
Because the second stage of the game involves two decision variables for each of the 
two firms, visualizing the geometry of the reaction function equilibrium is difficult. One 
36 
kind of graphical interpretation of Proposition 3 can be achieved using "conditional' best 
response functions denoted, for firm i, by r'(qj, Kj) and defined as firm i"s optimal output 
conditional on capital stock K,. and given that firm j produces qj. These conditional best 
response fixnctions are implicitly defined by'"* 
(3.41) iu^r'(q,.K,). q,, K|)sO and 
(3.42) r'(q„K,), K,).0. 
qf and q, are determined by the intersection in the (q,, q,) plane, of r'(q2,Kf) and 
r~(q,.Kf). Similarly, qf' and qj are determined by the intersection of r'Cqi.Kf ) and 
r~(q,.K2 ) • Differentiating (3.41) with respect to q, and K, . we have 
(3.43) ;^(q2.K, )= -^ < 0 and ^(qj ,K,) = > 0. 
Likewise, differentiating (3.42) with respect to q, and K,, we also have; 
^(q„K,)  <Oand ;^(q„K,)  >0.  
Conditional best response flmctions slope downward and shift outward as capital increases 
(See figure 2). Proposition 3 establishes that Kf > Kf for i = 1 and 2. in the symmetric 
case, so the conditional best response functions shift out in going from the non-strategic to 
strategic equilibrium. This is consistent, as Figure 2 shows (and Proposition 3 proves), with 
qf > qf for i = 1 and 2. 
Note that KJJ does not depend on Kj except through K,. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of the strategic and non-strategic equilibria 
J 
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Proposition 4: Assuming symmetry, firms earn less profit at the strategic equilibrium 
than at non-strategic equilibrium. 
Proof: Applying Taylor's theorem to the profit fimction 7t' = g'^K,. K,). there exists a point 
on the line segment connecting (Kf.Kf) and (K,^.K2 ) such that 
(3.44) 
g^(K?,K!)-g '(Kr,Kj ' )  = 
g^K;.K;)(K?-Kr)+gUK;.K:)(Kf-Kr).  
Rewriting (3.44) as. 
(3.45) Ag' = g|. ^AKj + gL_ (•^)AKj = (gj. (*) + g|.^ W)aK, . 
where the second equality follows because AK,=AK2 under symmetry. 
Now gi; (.) = u; ^ ^ ^ + ^1. ^nj. (.|. 
where, for example, 7i;,^(*) = 7i;,_|q,(K|.K2), K,(k|,K2), K') , and 
^q, (*) (*) = ® by envelope theorem. 
Likewise, g^^ (*) = ^!,>) ^  + K, ^ ^ ^ envelope 
theorem. Therefore the equation, (3.45), can be written as 
(3.46) Ag' = 
die jy + 4 ( * )  
AK, = 
^ dK, ' 
AK, 
5q j 5q • 
because ^ by symmetry. Now < 0. Also, as shown in the proof of 
"J -'-I 
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Proposition I. Tij. < 0 between (Kf.Kf)and ) and therefore at (Kj.Ki). From the 
proof of Proposition 3. —r= > 0. Finally, by Proposition 2, AK, is positive. Using 
5Kj 
these results in (3.46) leads to Ag' < 0. which implies 7rf < Tuf'. O.E.D. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter generalizes Brander and Spencer's (1983) model of firms" strategic 
investment behavior by allowing for investment over time subject to convex adjustment 
costs. In the synraietric duopoly case, several features of the strategic equilibrium contrast 
with results for the naive equilibrium in which firms fail to exploit capitals" strategic role; i) 
Strategic firms "overinvesf' in the first period in the sense that the initial investment in 
capital is larger than necessary to minimize adjustment costs, ii) In the strategic equilibrium, 
output and overall capital investment (for both periods combined) is larger than in the non-
strategic equilibrium. Because the output market equilibriimi is imperfectly competitive, this 
raises the possibility that welfare might be higher in the strategic equilibrium than in the non-
strategic equilibrium, iii) Strategic firms face a situation reminiscent, in one respect, of the 
familiar "Prisoner's Dilemma" game. A firm can benefit by unilaterally "overinvesting" in 
order to influence the market outcome in a subsequent stage. But when both pursue these 
incentives, profits fall for both. 
Beyond these modest generalizations of Brander and Spencer's results, the model 
yields an insight which will be useful in formulating the dynamic cost of adjustment model to 
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be developed in subsequent chapters. That insight is captured by equation (3.21). which we 
reproduce here for convenience. 
(3.21)8LjK,.K,)=^; ,^+:rL =0.  
.A.gain. firm i's first-order condition for optimal first period investment involves two effects. 
The direct effect (represented by TC ~ ) accounts for the firm's incentive to economize on 
adjustment costs. The indirect, or "strategic," effect (represented by 7t' ) anticipates 
SKj 
firm j"s future reaction to today's investment decision by firm i and recognizes that that 
reaction may have an independent effect on firm i's profit. 
Our dynamic cost of adjustment model will involve a multi-firm, multi-stage 
generalization of the model of this chapter. We will not explicitly solve for the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium for this model. But, drawing upon lessons learned from the simple 
model, we will incorporate a strategic effect, similar to that in equation (3.21). in the dynamic 
adjustment cost model's first order condition for optimal investment.''* 
'•* Investment by firm i in one period will be allowed to trigger arbitrary rivals' quantity 
responses in the next period which, in turn, affect firm i through their effect on next period's 
price. 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL MODEL I: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
In this chapter we will lay out the theoretical foundations of our empirical models for 
the measurement of market power. Particularly, we analyze the intertemporal nature of the 
capital investment decision arising from both capital adjustment cost and strategic 
interactions among firms. In establishing a comprehensive framework, we will be aware of 
how modeling dynamic behavior of capital investment away from standard static models can 
lead to both different results and interpretations and how inferences of market power differ 
across models. 
Let us assume a representative firm produces a single output y" using two variable 
inputs; labor (LO, and materials (M^) at prices, WL, and w^,; and the services of stocks of 
quasi-fi.xed capital (K^), where j =1, 2,..., n indexes firms. The quantities of the variable 
factors employed can be costlessly changed without delay, whereas the stock of the quasi-
fixed input is costly to adjust. 
The production technology is represented by a variable cost flmction which specifies 
the minimum expenditure on variable factors needed to produce y^Cs), given the amount of 
the quasi-fixed factor K^Cs): 
(4.1) c',= ax WL(S), WM(S), KJ(S), y(s), s ) = w(s) U(s) + w^Cs) Mj(s) 
where WL(S), and w^Cs) are period s prices for labor, and materials, respectively. Note that 
the dependence of C^^(*) on s allows for technological change. K'(s) is the capital input used 
in period s. y(s) is the output in period s. UCs), and M^(s) are optimal variable factor 
employment levels in period s. The properties of the variable cost fimction are 
i. 8C\ /dw, > 0, i = L. M (nondecreasing in variable input prices) 
ii. is concave in and w^. 
iii. dC'JdK' < 0 (nonincreasing in the quasi-fixed factor) 
iv. d^C'JdK!' > 0 (convexity in the quasi-fixed factor) 
v. CVQWL. 0WM, K\ Y. S ) = 0C^(WL. WM, K', Y, s) for any scalar 0 (linear homogeneity in 
variable factor prices) 
vi. dC\. /5y^ > 0 (nondecreasing in output) 
Shepherd's lemma can be applied to equation (4.1) to obtain conditional factor demands 
for the variable inputs. 
dO (4.2) -?^=LXs) 
dC (4.3) ^=MXs) 
We assume that the flow of capital services in any period is proportional to the stock 
of the capital asset, and the stock evolves according to a perpetual inventory process. Thus, 
capital accumulation is governed by the following equation. 
(4.4)P(s) = KJ(s)-(l-5)KJ(s-l), 
where P(s) is gross investment in period s and 5 is a fixed depreciation rate, such that 
0 < 6 <  1 .  
Quasi-fixed capital is subject to an adjustment cost that is internal to the firm. We 
assume that adjustment costs are written as 
(4.5)c',= CWs)-(l-5)KJ(s-l)), 
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t 
where C\ is an increasing and convex function of gross investment: (•) > 0. and 
tt 
Ci (•) > 0. Thus, the firm might not wish to close the gap between the steady state level 
and the actual level of capital stock entirely within one time period and instead might find it 
desirable to economize on current adjustment costs at the expense of having a less efficient 
capital stock, thereby optimally spreading the adjustment process out over time. Note that in 
period s. the decision maker chooses P(s) given K^(s-l). or equivalently chooses K\s) given 
K'(s-l). Note also that K^(s) enters production in period s. 
Output price is given by an inverse output demand function: 
(4.6) P(s) = D(Y(s), z(s)) 
n 
where D(«) is twice continuously differentiable and nonincreasing in output, Y(s) = ^ y^(s) 
is aggregate industry output, and z(s) is a vector of exogenous demand shifters. 
The jth firm's problem is to maximize, at each date t, the expected present value of 
the flow of fiinds. Thus 
(4.7) E, 2]a(t,s) [D(Y(s), z(s)) yCs) - C^(WL(S), W^CS), K^S), /(S), S ) 
S=I 
- (KXs) - (1- 5)KXS-1)) - WK(S) K^(S)I 
where E, represents expectation conditional on information available at time t 
(later denoted Q,), and w^ is the rental price of one unit of capital. a(t, s) is the factor for 
discounting period s flmds to period t.'^ 
In particular, a(t, t) = 1 and, with nominal interest rate r, a(t. s) = l/(l+r)^'V 
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In the maximization of the objective function above. z(s). WL(s). WM(s). and Wj;(s) are 
exogenous stochastic processes, and K'Ct-l) is given at time t. The decision maker chooses 
y^(t) and. K^t) at time t, and decision rules for choosing 
y(t+l), y'(t+2), y(t+3), and K^Ct+l). KJ(t+2). KJ(t+3) 
as functions of the information that will be available when these variables have to be chosen. 
We can denote these decision rules: 
Yc-i )• yt"'^2 (^t*2 )• and \ ) 
Note that our regression equations will be derived from the first order conditions for optimal 
choice of yCt) and K^t). 
Now, to solve the optimization problem, the objective fimction in (4.7) can be 
rewritten as 
D(Y(t), z(t)) y'(t) - C, (wjt), WM(t), KJ(t), y(t), t) 
- C,(KXt) - (1- 5)KJ(t-l)) - wj,(t) K'(t) 
+ Et (terms that do not involve y'(t)) 
=1+1 
Differentiating the above with respect to ^(t) yields the following first order condition. 
(4.8) 
D(Y(t),z(t))*yi(t)52(^W)^_^^ w,(t), w„{t), KJ(,), yJ(t), t)-0 
Rewriting equation (4.8) yields 
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(4.9) P(t/l+M) w,(t), w„(t), KJ(t), yJ(t). t) 
V s(t); ayj(t) 
where P(t) is output price in period t; X.^(t) = Y(t) conjectural elasticity of 
aggregate output with respect to the jth firm's output, an index of oligopoly conduct; and 
8(t) = output market demand elasticity. This equation, (4.9). 
expresses equality between the firm's short-run marginal cost and its perceived marginal 
revenue. 
Rearranging equation (4.9) yields a Lemer index of performance; 
, (P-MC) XJ 
L^, = = If ^^(t) = 0 (i.e., L\ = 0), then the jth firm behaves competitivelv. 
re 
setting price equal to marginal cost, and if A.^(t) = 1 (i.e., L^,= - 1/s), then jth firm operates 
with the pure monopoly markup of price over marginal cost. 
To analyze firm j's choice of capital in period t, let us return to expression (4.7) again 
and rewrite it as 
D(Y(t), 2(t)) Y(t) - C, (WL(t), WM(t), K'(t), Y(t), t) 
- C\ (KJ(t) - (1- 5)KXt-I)) - WK(t)KJ(t) 
+ E. a(t, t+1) [ D(Y(t+l), z(t+l)) y(t+l) 
- C\ (w,(t+l), WM(t+l), KJ(t+l), y'(t+l), t+1) 
- C3 (KXt+I) - (1- 5)KW) - WK(t+l)K^(t+l)l 
ee 
+ E, ^ (terms that do not involve KJ(t)) 
sar+2 
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For the moment, we ignore any impact of a choice of K'(t) on rival's decisions in fiiture 
periods. Under this naive assumption, differentiating the objective function with respect to 
KXt) would yield the following Euler equation. 
(4.10) 
yW' t ) -Ci ' (KKt)-( l -5)KHt- l ) ) -w^(t)  
o K^(t) 
+ E,a(t.t + l)(l-5)Ci'(KJ(t + l)-(l-5)KHt)) = 0 
Rearranging this yields 
(4.11) 
' dC^ 
wJt) + Ci (KJ(t)-(l-5)KJ(t-l)) = --^(WL(t). w„(t), K^t), yJ(t). t) 
5KJ(t) 
+ E,a(t, t + I)(l -5)Ci'(KJ(t +1)-(1 -5)KHt)) 
Note, however, that in the version of condition (4.11) for period t+1, the second term 
f 
on the left-hand side is Ca (K-'(t + l)-(l-5)K-'(t)). As long as marginal adjustment costs 
are not constant (so that period t+1 adjustment cost depends on KJ(t)), the jth firm's choice 
a-c-", 
of KJ(t) will affect its choices of capital in subsequent periods. As long as —:—^ is not 
zero, these impacts on future capital will affect firm j's marginal costs in future periods. 
This, in turn, will alter the future output market equilibria. Thus, here, as in the illustrative 
two-period model of Chapter 3, investment decisions have a strategic effect stemming from 
the impact of current investment on rivals' output and, ultimately, price in future periods. 
Firm j's marginal condition (4.11) does not incorporate this strategic effect, however. (4.11) 
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could be said to characterize a "naive" equilibrium, in which firms do not anticipate the 
effects that their investment decisions have on rival's actions. 
In reality, the dynamic cost of adjustment model is a complicated dynamic game in 
which players' period t strategies have impacts on rivals" objective functions in subsequent 
periods. In her survey of empirical applications of oligopoly games. Slade (1995) notes that 
characterization of the equilibria of such models can be intractable unless simplifying 
assumptions are made. For the purposes at hand, we assume that rivals' future responses to 
the jth firm's choice of capital in period t are confined to period t+1. From the perspective of 
firm j. the meaningful part of this reaction is the impact it will have on market output in 
period t+1. Furthermore, we assume that the jth firm's perception of this impact is captured 
by a "dynamic conjectural variation," 5Y'^(t+l)/5K'(t), which we assume to be a constant, y. 
where Y~^ = • With these assumptions, the jth firm's decision problem is a dynamic 
optimization problem that can be treated in isolation; that is. without reference to rivals" 
problems. Yet, the jth firm's problem does incorporate a strategic effect of capital 
investment, at least in one ad hoc way, and enables us to characterize a more "sophisticated" 
equilibrium than the one represented by equation (4.11).'^ 
The derivation leading to equation (4.11) now yields: 
The approach taken here is essentially the same as that used by Roberts and Samuelson 
(1988) in their analysis of the strategic effects of advertising expenditure in the cigarette 
industry. They also use the terms "naive" and "sophisticated" equilibria in the way we have 
here. 
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(4.12) 
dO 
Wj.(t )  +  CJ (KJ(t) - ( l -6)KJ(t- l ) )  =  -—j7-(  WL(t) ,  WM(t) ,  KJ(t) ,  yJ(t ) ,  t )  
aKJ(t) 
+E,a(t.t +1) 
dD, vSV-id + l) . (1 -5)CJ (KJ(t +1)-(1 -5)KJ(t)) + —(Y(t +1),z(t +1)) ^ yJ(t +1) 
BY dK\t) 'J 
or 
dC 
wJt) + Ci (KJ(t)-(l-5)KJ(t-l)) = -^^( w^d), w^d), KKt), y(t). t) 
P(t + 1) yj(t + l) 
+ E,a(t,t + 1) (l-6)Ci + + 
where e(t + l) = ||(Y(t + l),z(t + l)) P(t  +  1)  
Y(t  +  1)  
is the market demand elasticity in period 
0Y-j(t +1) 
t+1 and — is firm j's dynamic conjectural variation of next period's rivals" 
output with respect to this period's own capital.'' Equation (4.12) says that, when capital is 
optimally employed, the rental price plus the adjustment cost attributable to the last unit 
installed in period t is just offset by the resulting savings in period t variable cost plus the 
expected present value of period t+1 adjustment cost savings (due to installation of the imit of 
capital in t rather than t+1) minus the expected marginal loss of future revenue due to the 
price decrease resulting from rivals' increased production. 
'Mn the derivation of equation (4.12), the envelope theorem allows us to ignore the effects of 
firm j's choice of K^(t) on its own future actions. Also in Chapter 3's model, the counterpart 
of the y introduced here is 5q '/dKj. To the extent that the results of Chapter 3's model are 
generalizable to the present case, the expected sign for -f is negative. 
j 
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In sum. the "short-run model" consists of equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.9). This 
model does not explain the determination of capital, but merely treats it as exogenous. The 
"dynamic cost of adjustment model" consists of equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.9). and (4.12). 
The "long-run model" is obtained from the present formulation by assuming that capital 
adjustment costs are identically zero, so that capital is chosen in each period to minimize the 
total cost of producing the optimal output level and there are no intertemporal strategic 
investment effects. That is. for given y'(t), K'(t) is chosen to minimize 
C\ ( WL(t). WM(t), KJ(t), y'(t), t) + WK(t)KJ(t). 
The first order condition for this problem is 
dC! (4-13) -^^( WL(t),WM(t),KJ(t). yJ(t), t) = WK(t). 
The long-run model, then consists of equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.9), and (4.13). 
In this chapter, we have developed two types of theory-consistent empirical models 
for measuring firm market power. One type (consisting of the short-run and long-run 
equilibrium models) is derived from a static optimization problem for the firm and the other 
(i.e., the dynamic cost of adjustment model) is based on the intertemporal nature of firms" 
optimizing behavior with the emphasis on the strategic role of capital investment. All of 
these theoretical models will be used as a basis for economic interpretation of the data in the 
next chapter. Furthermore, since all the models that we have developed in this chapter have 
been grounded at the firm-level, we will develop industry-level counterparts that use 
aggregate data collected from industry sources. 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL MODEL II: FUNCTIONAL FORMS AND 
AGGREGATION ISSUES 
This chapter translates our theoretical models developed in Chapters 3 and 4 into 
implementable models and introduces the hypotheses to be tested. The specification of the 
empirical models begins with the selection of a flexible functional form for the cost function. 
Then the eqiiations of the models are reinterpreted in terms of this cost function. Finally we 
discuss the issue of checking the cost function properties. 
One of the most important reasons why flexible functional forms have been used in 
econometric applications is that they have sufficient parameters to reproduce comparative 
static effects without imposing many prior restrictions on the economic phenomena being 
measured. Thus, cost functions with a flexible form, which can be interpreted as second 
order approximations to arbitrary cost ftmctions. have been widely used in the empirical 
literature. In our analysis, we follow Denny, Fuss, and Waverman (1981) in the use of a 
quadratic cost function, as one of the flexible flmctional forms, since this choice permits the 
measurement of market power without losing aggregation consistency. 
As with many applied econometric studies, firm-level data are not accessible; only 
industry data can be obtained. Since the theoretical model is posed in terms of firm-level 
optimization problems involving firm-level cost flmctions, an industry-level model must first 
be derived from it before using industry-level data in the econometric analysis. In what 
follows, we carry out aggregation of firm-level relations to industry-level counterparts. 
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Assume that the jth firm's variable cost function. Cj takes the following quadratic 
form: 
(5.1) Ci = bo + bi. WL + BM WM + b, y + bK K' + bi- T 
+ 0.5{bLL(wL)' + bMM(wM)' + byy(y)" + bKK(KO~ + bTT{T)"} 
+ bLM WL WM 
+ h^K' WL + b^MK^WM+bfCyK^ yJ 
+ bLy WL y + bwy WM y + byt 
+ bLT Wl T + bwr Wm T + b^r T 
where j = 1.2,.... n indexes firms. 
Given this specification for C^,. equations (4.2), and (4.3) become: 
(5.2) = b^ + btL WL + bLM WM + ^kl + bLy y + bLT T 
(5.3) = bw + bMM WM+ BLM Wl + b^^ + bwy y + bMr T 
Summing across all n firms we have industry-level factor demands: 
(5.4) L = BL + BLL WL+ ELM W^ + b^L K+ bLy Y + Blt T 
(5.5) M = B„ + BMM WM+ ELM wl + b^M K. + bwy Y + BMT T 
where Bl = nbL, Bm = nbM, Ell ~ nbLL- Emm ~ nb^M, Elm ~ nbLM» Elt ~ nbLy, 
BMT = nhwr; and K = and Y = are industry aggregate capital stock and 
output respectively. 
Assume that market demand for the industry's product takes the following constant 
elasticity form: 
(5.6) In Y = a + £ ln(P/S) + |i In (Z/S) 
where S = the implicit GDP price deflator, Z = GDP in current dollars, e = output market 
demand elasticity, E. a, and (I are unknown parameters. Equation (4.9) then becomes 
(5.7) P(1 + —) = b, + bLy WL + bwy WM + b^y + byy V + bLx T 
,'aDV'D(Y.Z) 
where e = 
Multiplying by 1/n and summing across fums. we have 
(5.8) P(l + ^ ) = i^^ 
= by + bLy WL+ bMy WM + K+ b^ Y + bLx T 
^ ^ I " 
where bj;^ = bf-y/n, b^^. = b^n, and >. = — V the simple average of the individual firms' 
n^ 
conduct parameters. 
The equations, (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), and (5.8) make up the short-run equilibrium model 
for the industry. The output supply relation of equation (5.8) is the basis for estimating an 
index of market power at the industry level, and a corresponding industry level performance 
P _ l y ^  
n dy' X 
index. Rearranging (5.8) we have: L, = '• = . Thus, the industry's 
P E 
"average" Lemer index is given by - XJe. 
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The adjustment cost ftmction is assumed quadratic in order to limit the number of 
parameters to be estimated; that is, 
(5.9) Qa(t)) = 0.5 b„[I(t)]-
Then. equation (4.12) in the dynamic cost-of-adjustment model averaged over n firms 
becomes 
(5.10) - WK = bK + bLK WL + b^M WM + b^K K + Y + bKx T 
+ b„ (K(t)-(l-5)K(t-I)) 
-E,a(t,t+l)[(l-6)b„(K(t + l) - (1-5) K(t)) +7^^^ J 
~ 1 ^ •y^(t+i) 
where bj^^ = bjy; / n. b„ = b,, / n, y s —y . and y = . which is the market-share 
n j=i i(t + I) 
weighted average of firms' dynamic conjectural variations with respect to capital.'* Thus, the 
dynamic cost of adjustment model consists of equations, (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), (5.8). and (5.10). 
The parameter y can be used to formulate tests of firm's strategic conduct in capital 
investment. 
To get the long-run equilibrium model, equation (4.13), an equilibrium condition for 
capital when capital adjustment costs are zero, is added; 
dO (5.11) -w^ = = bK + bKL WL + bKM WM + b^K + b^y y' + b^T T 
Taking a simple average of equation (5.11) over n firms yields 
(5.12) - WK = b^ + bjcL WL+ bRM Wm + b^^ K + b^y Y + bKx T 
Note that we have used (5.6) in writing the elasticity of demand as a constant. 
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The long-run model consists of equations. (5.4). (5.5). (5.6). (5.8), and (5.12). 
Because n, the "number of firms in the industry." is not known, not all of the parameters 
of the firm-level cost flmction (equation (5.1)) can be recovered through estimation of 
industry level relations. In what follows, we discuss the extent to which we can check the 
properties of the variable cost fimction given in Chapter 4. 
i) Nondecreasing in variable input prices 
dCl I- = B^ + BU. WL + BLM WM + B^L + BLV Y + B^T T 
dw^ 
should be nonnegative for all j. But we only can check this condition at the industry level. 
Summing over all firms, j = 1.2 n. yields 
®LL ^LM ^LY ^ T > 0, 
which should be satisfied at all sample points. Likewise, nondecreasing in material price "at 
the industry level" requires 
BM BMM BLM WL + B^M K + B^Y Y + BMT T > 0 at all sample points. 
ii) Concave in factor prices 
For the variable cost function to be concave in factor prices, the Hessian matrix must be 
negative definite. 
5Wh 5Wj h.i=L.M 
'LL 
."LM 
'LM 
'MM, 
is negative definite if and only if 
B LM 
LM B MM 
is negative definite. 
In other words, the model must satisfy Bu., BMM < 0, and (BU^BMM - Bu^,*) > 0. 
D5 
iii) Nonincreasing in the quasi-fixed factor 
The cost fiinction is nonincreasing in the quasi-fixed factor 
dC if —1- = bf; + b^L Wl + bjo^ + b^K y' + b^x T < 0. But we only can check this 
condition at the industry level. Averaging over all firms, j = 1,2 n, yields 
WL + bjj^ WM + b,Y^ K + B^Y ^ T < 0 at all sample points. 
iv) Convexity in the quasi-fixed factor 
d'O The cost function is convex in the quasi-fixed factor if bi^^ > 0* which is satisfied if 
and only if b^^^ > 0. Note that checking properties (iii) and (iv) requires estimates from the 
long-run or dynamic cost of adjustment models. 
v) Linear homogeniety in variable factor prices 
One drawback of the quadratic functional form is that there is no way to impose linear 
homogeneity through parametric restrictions. 
vi) Nondecreasing in output 
The cost function is nondecreasing in output if 
dC' 
—-i-= b,, + bLv Wl + bwv Wm + bj;v + b„ y^ + bLT T > 0. But we only can check this dyJ • ' ... 
condition at the industry level. Averaging over ail firms, j = 1, 2,..., n, yields 
by ^Ly Wl + b^y w^ + b^y K+ hyy Y + bLT T > 0 at all sample points. 
We will check these theoretical properties of the variable cost function using the estimation 
results that will be provided in next chapters. Before proceeding with this, however, using 
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the industry-level model systems we have derived, we will analyze data from the U.S. 
transformer industry for the 1958-1991 period, hoping that we have taken into consideration 
the most important components of firms" decision-making behavior. 
The next chapter discusses estimation methods and their validity for each of the three 
systems of equations, and also deals with some issues about model specification tests. 
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CHAPTER 6. ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
Once the system of estimating equations is specified, the question becomes what sort 
of econometric procedures might be used. In this chapter, we start with the descriptions of 
some parameter restrictions implied by the short-nm. long-run, and dynamic cost of 
adjustment model structures. Then, we address the estimation procedures to be used for the 
three simultaneous equation systems. Finally, we explain a model specification test method 
to be used to assess the comparative performance of the models. 
Equations (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), (5.8), (5.10), and (5.12) are the basis for our empirical 
models. For convenience, we rewrite them here as equations. (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), (6.4), (6.5). 
and (6.6). Subscripts are used to denote observations, the expectation operator in equation 
(5.10) has been dropped, and random error terms have been added. 
(6.1) L(t) = Bl + Bll Wjt) + Elm WM(t) + B^t K(t) + bi., Y(t) + Blt T(t) + UL(t) 
(6.2) M(t) — B|i4 + Bf^ w^,(t) + (t) + K(t) + bM,Y(t) + Bmt T(t) + UM(t) 
(6.3) In Y(t) = a + e ln(P(t)/S(t)) + ^ In (Z(t)/S(t)) + Uv(t) 
(6.4) P(t) (1 + ^ ) = b, + bl., WL(t) + bM, WM(t) + K(t) + byy Y(t) + b^T T(t) + up(t) 
£ 
(6.5) - Wk (t) = bj: + b^L WL(t) + bR^ Wwd) + H^k K(t) + b^^y Y(t) + b^r T(t) 
+ b„ (K(t)-(l-5(t)) K(t-l)) 
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- a(t. t+1) 
P(t + I) 1 (l-5(t))b„(K(t + I) - (l-5(t)) K(t)) -ry—-— J-Uj;(t) 
(6.6) - Wk = + bKL Wl (t) + b^M Wm (t) + K:(t) + b^;,, Y(t) + b^j T(t) + u^Ct) 
where UL, u^, Uy, Up, and are the random errors in each equation. 
The short-run model, consisting of equations (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4). embodies 
structure imposed by the theory of the profit maximizing firm in the form of over-identifying 
cross-equation restrictions on parameters BLM. bLy. and b^y- The long-run model adds an 
equation, (6.6), and additional cross-equation restrictions on bRi., b^w^ and b^;^.. Thus, the test 
of the long-run model against alternative theories of the determination of capital stock turns 
out to be a test of these restrictions. Further, the test of the cost-of-adjustment model against 
the long-run model is a test of b,, = y =0 in the context of (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), (6.4), and 
(6.5). 
The error terms in the equation sets of the short-run and long-run models are assumed 
to have zero expected values, and positive definite, constant, contemporaneous covariance 
matrix. The equation sets characterizing the short-run and long-run models are estimated as a 
complete system using the nonlinear iterative three stage least squares estimator. Although 
fiill information maximum likelihood (FIML) is theoretically favorable, since non-linear 
three stage least squares (NL3SLS) does not require a normality assumption, it is a fi-equently 
used method for relatively small samples as in our data. 
It is natural to ask which equilibrium specification is more appropriate to explain the 
strucnire of production and factor demands given the information from the data. One 
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approach to testing the long-run model would be to estimate the equation system by full 
information maximum likelihood and then test the restrictions using a likelihood ratio 
procedure, or estimate them by three stage least squares and test the restrictions using some 
appropriate counterpart to the likelihood ratio test. However, the problem with this approach 
is that it requires that equations of the form (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), (6.4), and (6.6) remain the true 
specification even when the restrictions are not imposed. But if the capital stock is not at the 
long-run equilibrium level, it is unlikely that the correct specification for capital stock would 
be of the form of equation (6.6). An altemative approach follows the test method developed 
by Schankerman and Nadiri (1986). With short-run equilibrium as a maintained hypothesis. 
the Schankerman and Nadiri procedure enables us to test the null hypothesis HQ: Capital is at 
its ftill static equilibrium level (i.e., the long-run equilibrium model) versus an altemative 
hypothesis H,: The stock of capital is determined by some other unspecified method. 
t 
Let P = (bjy^, b^M' b|^y) ^e the vector of parameters in the capital demand equation 
(5.12) of the long-run equilibrium model which also appear in the short-nm equilibrium 
model. The long-run model implies cross-equation restrictions involving these parameters, 
while estimating short-run equilibrium model does not impose any of these restrictions on p. 
Let P be a consistent and asymptotically efficient estimator of p on HQ. We can take p to be 
the 3SLS estimator of P from the long-run model. V is the asymptotic covariance matrix of 
this estimator. Let p be an estimator of P that is consistent on HQ or H,. We can take P to 
be the 3SLS estimator of P from the short-run model. V is the asymptotic covariance matrix 
of p obtained from 3SLS estimation of short-run equilibrium. The test statistic is 
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I 
M = (P — p) W~' (P — p). where W is a consistent estimator of V — V. On H^, M is 
distributed Xq- where q (=3) is the number of parameter restrictions being tested. 
The dynamic cost of adjustment model consists of equations (6.1), (6.2), (6.3). (6.4). 
and (6.5). The error terms in die first four equations represent optimizing errors (equations 
(6.1), (6.2), and (6.4)) or the effect of omitted variables (equation (6.3)), but the error term in 
equation (6.5) is an expectation error which arises when the conditional expectations of the 
future values of variables in (6.5) are replaced by their actual values. The estimator used for 
this model is the GMM (generalized method of moments) estimator proposed by Hansen and 
Singleton (1982). Intuitively, the GMM estimator chooses parameter estimates so as to 
minimize the correlation between the model's error terms and a set of instrumental variables. 
The instrumental variables are chosen from the elements of the information set available to 
agents. In the case of equation (6.5), imposing orthogonality between the error term and the 
instruments amounts to an assumption of rational expectations. 
The Schankerman and Nadiri procedure can also be used to test the validity of the 
dynamic cost of adjustment model. With short-nm equilibrium as a maintained hypothesis, 
the test is: HQ: Capital is determined in a marmer consistent with the dynamic cost of 
adjustment model versus H,: The stock of capital is determined by some other unspecified 
method. As in the test of the long-run model, the test involves a comparison of two estimates 
of a vector of parameters which are subject to additional cross-equation restrictions when 
t 
is true: P = (b[^, b|^, b[^y,ej . p, the estimator of P that is consistent and asymptotically 
efficient on H^, is taken to be the GMM estimator from the dynamic cost of adjustment 
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model. P, the estimator of P that is consistent on or H,, is taken to be the 3SLS estimator 
from the short-run model. The test proceeds as described above using the M statistic. 
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CHAPTER 7. THE TRANSFORMER INDUSTRY 
For empirical implementation of the models, we use industry time-series data on the 
U.S. transformer industry. 1958-1991. The following section (7.1) reviews some previous 
studies on the oligopolisitic nature of the industry. Then section (7.2) presents data 
construction details for each of the variables along with some discussion of the conceptual 
issue of the user cost of capital. 
7.1 The transformer industry 
We analyze the transformer industry (SIC 3612) over the 1958-1991 period." It is 
one component of the electrical machinery industry (SIC 36) that Appelbaimi used in his 
1982 study of market power. Appelbaum found that the electrical machinery industry was 
characterized by sigruficant oligopoly power with an industry average Lemer's index value 
of 0.19 for the 1947-1971 time period. Hazilla (1991) estimated the Lemer's index to be 
0.17 based on an average of three different econometric estimates of the conjectural elasticity 
during the 1958-1974 time period. Hall's (1988) work also suggested that the electrical 
machinery industry had significant market power during the 1949-1985 time period. On the 
" The industry definition, "transformers, except electronic," that used in the 1987 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system. This industry is made up of establishments engaged 
in manufacturing power, distribution, instrument, and specialty transformers. 
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other hand, referring to SCP-type studies,'" the transformer industry was classified within a 
group of industries with four-firm concentration ratios of 75 per cent or higher during the 
1935-1972 time period. Shepherd (1970) made approximate ratings of barriers to entr\' for 
U.S. manufacturing industries and suggested that the transformer industry had ver\^ high 
barriers to entry during the early 1950s and 1960s. According to the 1987 Census of 
Manufactures report, the transformer industry was producing 1.9 % of SIC 36 output.*' 
There were 239 firms, the largest 4 firms producing 46% of industry output and its 
Herfindahl index" was 706 in the transformer industry (SIC 3612) while it was 129 in the 
electrical machinery industry (SIC 36) in 1987. 
The industry has a history of collusive behavior.^ A well-known price-fixing 
conspiracy among the companies making electrical equipment was in effect during the 1950s 
and 1960s. For example. Fuller (1962) described, "The conspiracies in the industry covered 
such equipment as circuit breakers, power transformers, and turbine generators, which are 
sold in large extent to power and light companies and government installations. Relatively 
little product differentiation can be developed among these informed buyers. As a result, a 
firm's sales depend on offering the best price. Although "book prices" are established for 
various products, sales are frequently "off book," and price competition has come to take the 
See, Kamerschen (1968) and Brozen (1982). 
The SIC 36 industry has 37 SIC four-digit industries in it. 
" The Herfindahl index is calculated by squaring the market share (in percent) of each of the 
top 50 companies. 
See also Sultan (1974). 
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form of competing percentages off book price. The cartel agreements were specially 
designed to prevent the instigation of price competition, which in some instances had forced 
prices down to 60 percent of book." And Caves (1986) pointed out "Like many cartel 
arrangements, the electrical manufacturers' agreements began because of the desire to 
maintain prices in the face of strong competitive pressures, but it was precisely these 
pressures which caused breaks to occur. Periodically, some firm with excess capacity would 
offer a discount to get a large order. Others would retaliate, and the cartel would lapse. 
Prices would fall to lower and lower levels, until something had to be done. The cry would 
go up to stabilize prices, and the meetings would start again." 
7.2 Data 
The data used in this research consist of annual time series of industry-level variables 
relating to the transformer industry (SIC 3612). The variables are mostly obtained from the 
NBER manufacturing productivity database which contains annual information on U.S. 
manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1991. The data themselves originally came from 
various government data sources, wdth many of the variables taken directly from the Census 
Bureau's Annual Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures. 
A price deflator for the industry's value of shipments is used as a measure of the 
model's output price. Real output quantity is taken to be the value of shipments (adjusted for 
inventory changes) divided by the price deflator. Material input price and quantity are 
similarly derived from series on a price deflator and nominal expenditures on the input. 
Labor input is measured by total production worker hours and labor price by average 
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production worker wages. A real capital stock series is available as a measure of the 
industry's capital input. 
The calculation of capital service price is based on the work of Christensen and 
Jorgenson (1969) and is slightly modified for availability of the data. Let the price for one 
unit of a capital asset in period t be J(t), and let the one period rate of return available to the 
firm on an alternative investment from t-1 to t be r(t). Define w^Ct) as the implicit one 
period rental rate of the capital asset. Let us consider an agent with J(t-1) dollars in cash at 
period t-1. Then he has two options: He can invest it at rate of interest r(t) or purchase one 
capital asset and rent it to a firm for one period at rental rate WK(t). Under the first option, he 
will own. at time t, a financial asset worth (1+ r(t)) J(t-l) dollars. Under the second option, 
he will own. at time t, a real asset and cash with value totaling (1 - u^Ct)) (w^Ct) - c(t)J(t-l)) + 
(1-5) J(t), where u^(t) is the effective corporate income tax rate, c(t) is the property tax rate 
in period t. and 5 is the physical depreciation rate for capital. The first term in this equation 
is the amount of rental income after tax and the second term is the market value of the 
undepreciated portion of the capital asset at date t. Now the value of the implicit rental rate 
on capital is the value of Wj^(t) that equalizes the two expressions:''' 
wK(t)  =  i_u -1)  + 5J(t ) - (J(t ) -J(t -1)) ]  +  c(t )J(t -1)  
In fact, 1/(1 - Uc(t)) is a simple version of the "effective" rate of taxation on capital income 
which is usually given by (1 - v(t)- u^(t)p)/(l- u^(t)) where p is the present value of 
depreciation deductions for tax purposes on a dollar's investment over the lifetime of the 
asset, and v(t) is the effective rate of the investment tax credit. But, it is very hard to get the 
available data for all variables in this tax formula. 
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where Uc(t) is calculated by the formula used by Christensen and Jorgenson (1969). which is 
simply taxes paid divided by property income before taxes: Uj(t) = (profit tax 
liability )/(property income). Note that, consistent with the definition of the Survey of 
Current Business, "property income" consists of profits fi'om current production and net 
interest payments. Moreover, as in Bemdt's early study (1976). we choose to focus only on 
the rate of return variable, the capital gain or loss on the value of the asset, and the corporate 
profits tax rate, ignoring the property tax term: 
WK(t)  =  y7^[r(t )J(t - l )  +  5J(t) - (J(t ) -J(t - l ) ) ]  
The NBER database contains, for each industry, a price deflator for new investment 
which will serve as a measure of J(t). The physical depreciation rate can be deduced fi-om the 
real capital stock, new capital spending, and the investment price deflator series. A Moody's 
bond yield on Aaa bonds (Economic Report of the President) was chosen as a proxy variable 
for the interest rate. Time series data on two additional variables appearing in the output 
demand equation, the implicit GDP price deflator (S) and GDP in nominal terms (Z) were 
also obtained from the Economic Report of the President. The tax variables are available in 
the Survey of Current Business and are reported on the basis of two-digit SIC manufacturing 
industries. 
The next chapter discusses the results obtained from the estimation of the models in 
Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
8.L Estimation of the short-run and long-run models 
As presented in the previous chapters, the short-run model consists of two industr\' 
input demand functions, the output demand fiinction. and the profit maximization condition, 
(6.1), (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4) respectively. The long-run model requires one additional 
equation specifying capital demand (6.6), along with the short-run model equations. 
We assume that the disturbance terms in each model are serially independently and 
identically distributed with mean vector zero and constant, contemporaneous covariance 
matrix. Estimation of these models was carried out using iterative NL3SLS. NL3SLS is 
used to take into account the fact that each model system is simultaneous and the disturbance 
terms are correlated across equations in any given time period. In the short-run model; L(t). 
M(t). Y(t). and P(t) are endogenous. Factor prices, nominal GDP, the GDP deflator, and the 
time trend are exogenous variables, and K(t) is predetermined. In the long-run model. K(t) 
becomes endogenous as well. 
The instruments that we used in the estimation of the two models are: a constant, real 
GDP. the wage rate (wj, the material price (w^,), a time trend (T), the rental rate of capital 
stock (WK), and the once-lagged value of each of these variables. Due to the lags and leads 
necessary to construct the data required for estimation, the effective part of the sample is 
1960-1990, including a total of 31 observations. 
The parameter estimates and standard errors are given in Table 2. The conventional 
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R- value and the Durbin-Watson statistics are presented in Table 3.*' The parameter 
estimates reported in Table 2 are analyzed to provide specific information on the applicability 
of the models to the data. First, the majority of parameters in the short-nm and the long-run 
model are significant. However, we need to check parameter estimates for consistency with 
the theoretical properties of the variable cost fiinction. As explained in Chapter 5. not all of 
these properties can be verified at the firm level. Monotonicity requirements of the cost 
fiinction with respect to the prices WL, w^, are met at the industry level at all sample points in 
the short-run model. Concavity of the variable cost function in input prices requires that the 
Hessian matrix of second order partial derivatives with respect to Wl, w^, be negative definite. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for this are given by: 
^LL ^ ^MM (^u. ^MM " ) > 0. 
The parameter estimates for BLL and have the right sign and are significantly different 
from zero, in the short-run model. The sign condition on the second order principal minor is 
satisfied with a marginal significance level of 13.8%. In the long-run case, the monotonicity 
and concavity conditions are satisfied with a good level of statistical significance. 
Furthermore, the variable cost function is decreasing in the capital stock "at the industry-
level" for all sample periods. Also convexity in the capital stock is verified with the positive 
value of b^K, with a marginal significance level of 21.1 %. Lastly, the variable cost fiinction 
The values of the D.W. statistics in the empirical results lead one to suspect serial 
correlation in the error terras of each equation. The equations of the short-run and long-run 
models were quasi-first-differenced and an effort was made to estimate the auto-regressive 
parameters and the structural parameters jointly by application of NL3SLS to these 
transformed models. These efforts were imsuccessful, however, due to convergence 
problems. 
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is increasing in output "at the industry-level" for all years in both models. Thus the variable 
cost function is reasonably well-behaved in the two models. 
As given in Table 2, the estimates of the own-price elasticity are significantly 
negative for both models. The significantly negative estimates of n in both models, taken at 
face value, would suggest that transformers are an inferior good. This surprising result raises 
suspicion that real income is merely serving as a proxy for a time trend and the significantly 
negative estimate of |a is a reflection of the fact that the industry is outdated, with demand 
steadily decreasing over time. To test this possibility, we re-estimated the model with a time 
trend in the demand equation (along with the real income term). The estimates of [i remained 
negative and the estimate of the time-trend variable were never statistically significant. Other 
parameter estimates changed by less than 5%.'® 
The measurement of market conduct and market performance is of primary interest in 
this study. The estimates of conjectural elasticities (k) are fairly consistent across the two 
models and highly significant. So, based on either set of results, we can reject the hypothesis 
of price-taking conduct. Combining the estimates of the demand elasticity (e) and the 
conduct parameter (k) yields an estimate of the index of performance, i.e., the Lemer index 
p _ l y  
n i dy' X 
of oligopoly power. The Lemer index was computed as L, = = — 
P e 
in our empirical models. The larger the index, the more oligopoly power the firm is able to 
Another possible treatment of the anomaly of negative income elasticity estimates may be 
to re-specify the demand equation using quality-adjusted price indexes for the products. But. 
unfortunately, the NBER Database used in this dissertation does not contain any data to 
handle changes in quality. 
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Table 2 
NL3SLS Estimation results for the short-run and long-run models 
Parameter Short-run model Long-run model 
BL 32.1861 (12.7924) 49.3588 (8.9324) 
BLL -3.86754 (2.30145) -8.50522(1.7727) 
BLM 12.5965 (14.868) 30.8315 (2.4759) 
bKL 0.0023 (0.0116) -0.0109 (0.9288E-02) 
buy 0.0131 (0.3494E-02) 0.0122 (0.3272E-02) 
BUT -0.2323 (0.9395) 0.9294(1.3147) 
BM 1190.57(156.281) 1129.6(122.919) 
BMM -966.475 (194.467) -1053.38(192.396) 
blCM -0.5529 (0.1602) -0.5277 (0.1186) 
^My 0.3307 (0.041) 0.3428 (0.0405) 
BMT 38.1024(10.6781) 34.0582 (9.5750) 
a 3.1862 (0.9715) 3.5292 (0.9606) 
E -2.6811 (0.3907) 
-2.9207 (0.3758) 
-0.6859 (0.2266) 
-0.8222 (0.2186) 
by 0.2890 (0.0584) 0.2655 (0.0558) 
•"Kv 
-'vT 
-9.15E-05 (4.02E-05) 
-4.I8E-05 (0.966E-05) 
0.0072 (0.2809E-02) 
-4.I1E-05 (0.3145E-04) 
-5.09E-05 (0.1338E-04) 
6.86E-03 (0.2947E-02) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
0.8381 (0.2498) 0.8773 (0.2876) 
L. 0.3125 (0.0884) 0.3003 (0.1001) 
bK N.A. 0.0230 (0.1026) 
^TK N.A. 0.01072 (0.6358E-02) 
N.A. 1.55E-04 (0.1242E-03) 
Note: Estimated standard errors in parentheses. N.A. = not applicable. 
Table 3 
and Durbin-Watson statistics from NL3SLS Estimation of 
the Short-run and Long-run models 
Short-run model Long-nm model 
Equations R' D.W. D.W. 
(6-1) 0.919 0.641 0.856 0.538 
(6-2) 0.934 1.021 0.937 1.057 
(6-3) 0.779 0.761 0.764 0.755 
(6-4) 0.992 1.104 0.991 1.101 
(6-6) N.A. N.A. 0.232 0.747 
Note: Each equation of each model was solved for one endogenous variable equation 
((6.1), L; (6.2), M; (6.3), hiY; (6.4), P; and (6.6), K). Using parameter estimates and 
observed values for the model's variables, "fitted series" for each endogenous 
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variable were then calculated using, in each case, just one structural equation. The 
reported R's are the squared simple correlation coefficients between these fitted 
series and the actual series. N.A. = not applicable. 
exercise. The estimates of Lemer's measure (Lj), presented in Table 1, are fairly consistent 
across the two models, and highly significant. This implies that it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that there exist positive price-cost differentials in the output market based on 
results from either the short-run or the long-run model. 
Now turning to the Schankerman and Nadiri test, we conduct the test to see whether 
the data for the transformer industry conforms with the long-nm model of economic 
behavior. The value of the test statistic (M) for the results reported was 25.43 with a 0.5% 
critical value of 10.6 for the distribution with 2 degrees of freedom."^ Thus the long-run 
equilibrium specification was rejected for the industry. This result implies that the services 
of capital stock in this industry are not employed up to the point at which marginal revenue 
product equals user cost in every period. 
8.2. Estimation of dynamic cost of adjustment model 
The rejection of the long-run model leaves open the question of how capital stocks are 
-• As frequently happens in practice, our W matrix (a consistent estimator of V - V) had one 
negative element on the diagonal. We follow the precedent set in several studies 
(Schankerman and Nadiri (1986), Bernstein and Mohnen (1991)) of conducting the tests on 
the basis of the subvector of p corresponding to the 2x2 positive definite submatrix of W. 
determined in this industry. We now turn our attention to the dynamic cost of adjustment 
model represented by (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), (6.4). and (6.5)."® 
The error terms appended to equations (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4) are assumed to 
represent optimizing errors, but the error term added to equation (6.5) is primarily an 
expectation error which arises when the conditional expectations of the future values of the 
variables in (6.5) are replaced by their actual values. The error in the Euler equation ought to 
reflect expectational errors only, but it is also affected by measurement or optimizing errors, 
and these, in turn, may be correlated with contemporaneous values of the exogenous 
variables appearing in the system of equations. This leads to the recommendation (Pindyck 
and Rotemberg (1982)) that GMM estimation be carried out using a conditioning set of 
instrumental variables which contains only lagged variables. The instruments we used in the 
estimation are: a constant, the one period lagged values of the capital stock (K(t-l)). labor 
(L(t-l)). materials (M(t-l)), output (Y(t-l)), the logarithm of GDP(t-l), a time trend (T(t-l)). 
output price (P(t-l)) and, the effective tax rate on capital income, and the two-period lagged 
values of K, M, WL, w^,, T, GDP, and P. 
The empirical results of GMM in the dynamic cost of adjustment model are reported 
in Table 4. The model actually estimated here differs from the one developed in Chapter 5 in 
one respect: Adjustment cost is assumed to be a function of net, rather than gross 
The discount factor, a(t, t+1), in equation (6.5) is replaced by l/(l+r,), where r, is the 
interest rate used in the calculation of the user cost. 
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Table 4 
GMM Estimation results for the dynamic cost of adjustment model 
Parameter Estimate Estimated standard error 
Bl 46.9363 8.1055 
Bu. -6.7227 1.3699 
Bu;, 23.0569 11.9977 
b^L -0.0185 0.862 lE-02 
bLy 0.0158 0.268 lE-02 
Blt 0.5951 0.6183 
Bm 1206.17 127.118 
B^c^ -890.175 178.919 
b^M -0.7418 0.1356 
bM, 0.3917 0.0412 
Bmt 32.9768 9.5678 
a 2.4243 0.9748 
e -2.0506 0.2891 
b -0.3409 0.1773 
bv 0.2794 0.0468 
b^y -7.28E-05 0.2930E-04 
byy -4.53E-05 0.9392E-05 
bvT 0.0053 0.2212E-02 
75 
Table 4. (continued) 
k 0.5601 0.1788 
L, 0.2731 0.0844 
bK -0.2682 0.2136 
^TK -4.31E-04 0.009 
bii 9.21E-04 0.0004 
bfCK 4.27E-04 0.0002 
y 1.3810 0.6529 
Table 5 
R^'s and Durbin-Watson statistics from GMM estimation of the dynamic cost 
of adjustment model 
Equations R" D.W. 
(6-1) 0.873 0.579 
(6-2) 0.935 0.999 
(6-3) 0.804 0.708 
(6-4) 0.992 1.045 
(6-5) 0.983 0.673 
Note: Table 3's note on the calculation of R^s applies here as well. The R"s for 
equation (6-5) are reflective of the models fit of the capital series. 
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investment.-' This change removes the three factors of 1 - 5(t) appearing in equation (6.5). 
The conventional R* values and the Durbin-Watson statistics are presented in Table 5. 
Overall the fit is good, as the R-'s are high in all five equations. Note the high R" of 
equation (6.5) is in contrast with the low R* in equation (6.6) in the long-run model. The 
estimates of the model's parameters generally have a good level of significance. 
Monotonicity requirements of the cost function with respect to the prices WL. w^, are met "at 
the industry level" at all sample points. Concavity of the variable cost flmction in input 
prices is well satisfied with a good significance level. The cost fimction is decreasing in 
capital stocks "at the industry level" for all years and the positive estimate of b,^ indicates 
convexity in the quasi-fixed factor with a marginal significance level of 3.16%. The cost 
function is also increasing in output "at the industry level" for all years. Therefore we can 
say that the estimated industry variable cost function is well behaved. 
As given in Table 4, and consistent with results form the short-run and long-run 
models, the own-price elasticity of output demand is negative and the income elasticity is 
positive. 
Table 4 also presents estimates of the Lemer's index (L,) and the conjectural elasticity 
(A.). Both are significantly different from zero but lower than the corresponding estimates 
obtained fi-om the short-run and long-run models. The performance index is 0.273, which is 
higher than the 0.2 that was found by Appelbaum (1982) for the U.S. electrical products 
industry (SIC 36) in 1947-1971. Thus the results of estimation of the dynamic cost of 
The model yielded a generally better fit with adjustment cost a function of net rather than 
gross investment. 
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adjustment model permit us to reject the hypothesis of price-taking conduct and competitive 
performance in the industry's output market. 
As an indication of the strategic effect of capital investment, the market-share 
weighted average of the dynamic conjectural variation parameter, y . is different from zero 
and statistically significant.^® The significance of this result suggests that we can reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no strategic effect of investment in this industry. In other words, 
firms appear to recognize that their choices of capital investment will influence the 
imperfectly competitive output equilibrium in future periods. The estimate of b„ provides 
evidence on the existence of costs of adjustment. As seen in Table 4, b|, is significantly 
positive with a marginal significance level of 13.9% (in a one-tailed test) suggesting positive 
and convex adjustment costs. Moreover, the estimates of the adjustment cost and strategic 
effect parameters are jointly different from zero with a chi-square value of 9.81 against a 
xio.oi critical value of 9.21. This result supports a rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
long-run model against the dynamic cost of adjustment model as an altemative. 
Further, we proceed to assess the validity of the dynamic cost of adjustment model 
using the Schankerman and Nadiri test. The value of the test statistic (xi) was 
However, the positive value turns out to be inconsistent with our theoretical result of 
equation (3.14) in Chapter 3. This inconsistency might be caused by different structures 
between the theoretical and the empirical models, e.g., in the empirical model, we have n 
firms and many periods rather than two firms and two periods. Also we may need to specify 
the empirical model to capture longer repercussions; that is, rivals' responses to an increase 
in own capital investment may extend beyond the next period. 
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26.70 with a marginal significance level of 0.002%, so that the dynamic model was also 
rejected.^' 
The marginal significance level was higher than that in the test of the long-run model, 
implying a kind of endorsement of the dynamic cost of adjustment model over the long-run 
model. 
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CHAPTER 9. SUMMARY 
In the past decades, industrial economists have developed a variety of approaches to 
measuring market power. Due to an increasing awareness of the limitations of the traditional 
SCP approach in measuring market power, the NEIO approach has been recently developed. 
The NEIO approach is firmly grounded in the neoclassical non-competitive theory of the firm 
to construct explicit structural models, and uses the latest econometric techniques to estimate 
structural parameters and to test structural hypotheses. NEIO studies for measiuing market 
power can be broadly divided into static models and intertemporal models. Mostly 
specifications in the NEIO models have represented the capital investment decision of firms 
as being undertaken without recognition of the incentives for strategic behavior arising when 
firms engage in a capital investment game over time. As extensively noted in the theoretical 
literature on oligopoly behavior, inclusion of capital stocks not only gives a firm control over 
its cost function intertemporally, but also opens up the possibility of its strategic use of 
capital stocks to its benefit by influencing the market environment in future time periods. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to measure the degree of market power within the 
context of each of three models; short-run, and long-run equilibrium models, and a dynamic 
cost of adjustment model with strategic capital investment; and to see how inferences of 
market power differ across the three cases. 
Chapter 3 examines a two-period duopoly model of strategic investment behavior by 
imperfectly competitive frnns. This chapter also generalizes Brander and Spencer's (1983) 
model of firms' strategic investment behavior by allowing for investment over time subject to 
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convex adjustment costs. In the symmetric duopoly case, several features of the strategic 
equilibrium contrast with results for the naive equilibrium in which firms fail to exploit 
capitals" strategic role: i) Strategic firms "overinvest" in the first period in the sense that the 
initial investment in capital is larger than necessary to minimize adjustment costs, ii) In the 
strategic equilibrium, output and overall capital investment (for both periods combined) is 
larger than in the non-strategic equilibrium. Because the output market equilibrium is 
imperfectly competitive, this raises the possibility that welfare might be higher in the 
strategic equilibrium than in the non-strategic equilibrium, iii) Strategic firms face a 
situation reminiscent, in one respect, of the familiar "Prisoner's Dilemma" game. A firm can 
benefit by unilaterally "overinvesting" in order to influence the market outcome in a 
subsequent stage. But when both pursue these incentives, profits fall for both. 
Chapters 4 and 5 develop comprehensive models for measuring market power within 
static and dynamic intertemporal frameworks. We delve into how modeling dynamic 
behavior of capital investment away fi-om standard static models can lead to both different 
results and interpretations and how inferences of market power differ across models. 
Drawing upon lessons learned from the simple theoretical model in Chapter 3, we incorporate 
a strategic effect in the dynamic adjustment cost model's first order condition for optimal 
investment. Our dynamic cost of adjustment model involves a multi-firm, multi-stage 
generalization of the theoretical model. Chapter 4 starts to introduce a quadratic cost 
function that permits the measurement of market power without losing aggregation 
consistency, followed by deriving three equilibriimi models for the presence of firm market 
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power and finally by some discussion on the cost function properties in terms of industrv-
level variables. 
Chapter 6 discusses the estimation methods. First, the statistical properties of three 
simultaneous equation systems from Chapter 5 are discussed. NL3SLS (non-linear three 
stage least squares) is used as an estimation method for two static equilibrium models. In 
addition, following Schankerman and Nadiri (1986), a specification test is conducted to see 
whether the long-run equilibrium model is consistent with the data. GMM suggested by 
Hansen and Singleton (1982) is used for the estimation of the dynamic adjustment cost 
model. We estimate the models by using data for the transformer industry producers. 1958-
1991. The historical evidence indicates that there existed a price-fixing behavior among the 
companies making electrical equipment during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Important results from the estimations are: i) The estimates of Lemer's measure are 
fairly consistent across the static models, and highly significant. This implies that it is 
possible to reject the hypothesis of price-taking behavior in the output market based on 
results from either the short-run or the long-run model, ii) The Schankerman and Nadiri test 
result shows that the long-run model may be rejected. This implies that the services of 
capital stock in this industry are not employed up to the point at which marginal revenue 
product equals user cost in every period, iii) The Lemer's index is lower in the dynamic 
model than that in the static models. As for the strategic effect of capital investment which is 
expressed as the market-share weighted average of the dynamic conjectural variation 
parameter, the statistically significant parameter suggests that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no strategic effect of investment in this industry, iv) The result of a 
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joint test with the estimates of the adjustment cost and strategic effect parameters supports a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the long-run model against the dynamic cost of adjustment 
model as an alternative. However, the Schankerman and Nadiri test of the dynamic cost of 
adjustment model also leads to rejection. 
J 
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APPENDIX. THE DATA FOR THE TRANSFORMER INDUSTRY 
Data on price indices and quantities of output, capital, labor, materials, and investment. 
U.S. transformer industry. 1960-90 
Year L" 
b a WM Q= p" GDP(Z)® 
1960 49.7 2.6539 1089.1986 0.287 1678.3105 0.438 513300 
1961 47.4 2.7637 1084.8591 0.284 1720.4326 0.416 531800 
1962 50.4 2.7182 1229.1228 0.285 1929.0726 0.399 571600 
1963 47.8 2.7573 1199.6479 0.284 1914.7756 0.379 603100 
1964 53.3 2.7654 1314.9306 0.288 2221.5424 0.376 648000 
1965 57.5 2.8556 1454.7619 0.294 2633.1521 0.368 702700 
1966 62.7 2.9681 1568.2120 0.302 2850.1313 0.381 769800 
1967 69.7 3.0616 1728.9389 0.311 3053.0710 0.407 814300 
1968 74.0 3,1662 1763.5512 0.321 3223.3332 0.420 889300 
1969 73.6 3.2866 1793.7125 0.334 3429.8994 0.398 959500 
1970 74.9 3.5914 1879.0960 0.354 3557.5307 0,405 1010700 
1971 67.5 3,8548 1782.7397 0.365 3510.6870 0.393 1097200 
1972 71.3 4,0126 1872.9946 0.374 3776.5625 0.384 1207000 
1973 78.4 4.1632 2061.5385 0.390 4342.5688 0.397 1349600 
1974 75.3 4.6972 2064.4172 0.489 4323.0932 0.472 1458600 
1975 56.2 5.1672 1565.2014 0.546 3120.9675 0.558 1585900 
1976 53.2 5.3590 1515.4515 0.576 3170.1569 0.573 1768400 
1977 62.5 5.5968 1707.0741 0.622 3737.5205 0.605 1974100 
1978 63.9 6.1909 1778.9864 0.671 3914.0158 0.635 2232700 
1979 68.0 6.4382 1799.3343 0.751 4143.0698 0.671 2488600 
1980 65.7 7.1293 1782.0665 0.842 4008.8552 0.734 2708000 
1981 66.5 7.6656 1836.4939 0.907 3934.8193 0.830 3030600 
1982 51.3 8.9863 1528.8172 0.930 3328.9919 0.883 3149600 
1983 49.8 9.1686 1505.0686 0.947 3142.2863 0.901 3405000 
1984 52.7 9.5218 1717.0061 0.982 3534.7873 0.917 3777200 
1985 49.5 9.9495 1749.3902 0.984 3444.1860 0.946 4038700 
1986 48.4 10.2190 1723.0452 0.972 3426.9875 0.956 4268600 
1987 46.7 10.0749 1656.4000 1.000 3249.3000 1.000 4539900 
1988 49.5 10.1353 1766.3919 1.092 3805.3481 0.991 4900400 
1989 50.3 10.1570 1829.1702 1.145 3699.1579 1.069 5250800 
1990 49.2 10.8902 1966.1104 1.139 3616.5502 1.148 5546100 
84 
Continued. 
Year K= 
d WK r J-" depreciation rate 
Tax 
rate 
GDP 
deflator 
1960 820.900 0.0689 0.0441 0.337 0.0621 0.5562 26 
1961 852.599 0.1215 0.0435 0.337 0.1088 0.5775 26.3 
1962 913.599 0.0280 0.0433 0.341 0.0072 0.5353 26.9 
1963 926.700 0.0435 0.0426 0.345 0.0284 0.5321 27.2 
1964 924.299 0.0535 0.044 0.351 0.0459 0.5271 27.7 
1965 937.099 0.0472 0.0449 0.358 0.0459 0.4661 28.4 
1966 990.500 0.0582 0.0513 0.368 0.0627 0.4600 294  
1967 1096.90 0.0358 0.0551 0.382 0.0342 0.4604 30.3 
1968 1187.69 0.0277 0.0618 0.400 0.0197 0.5135 31.8 
1969 1261.69 0.0526 0.0703 0.418 0.0325 0.5490 33.4 
1970 1322.50 0.0609 0.0804 0.444 0.0482 0.5244 35.2 
1971 1359.69 0.0329 0.0739 0.468 0.0166 0.4971 37.1 
1972 1357.00 0.0660 0.0721 0.487 0.0424 0.4637 38.8 
1973 1373.00 0.0869 0.0744 0.496 0.0422 0.4455 41.3 
1974 1396.50 0.0530 0.0857 0.534 0.0472 0.4389 44.9 
1975 1382.69 0.0105 0.0883 0.606 0.0514 0.3974 49.2 
1976 1381.80 0.0862 0.0843 0.640 0.0374 0.5239 52.3 
1977 1393.90 0.0973 0.0802 0.680 0.0627 0.4451 55.9 
1978 1427.00 0.0793 0.0873 0.722 0.0388 0.4274 60.3 
1979 1451.09 0.0912 0.0963 0.777 0.0485 0.4270 65.5 
1980 1470.69 0.1037 0.1194 0.851 0.0641 0.3745 71.7 
1981 1484.19 0.1513 0.1417 0.920 0.0503 0.3534 78.9 
1982 1484.80 0.2937 0.1379 0.962 0.0531 0.5370 83.8 
1983 1469.69 0.3216 0.1204 0.961 0.0544 0.4740 87.2 
1984 1463.90 0.3470 0.1271 0.961 0.0625 0.4748 91.0 
1985 1463.40 0.3852 0.1137 0.960 0.0566 0.5727 94.4 
1986 1460.50 0.2639 0.0902 0.981 0.0480 0.5727 96.9 
1987 1420.80 0.2239 0.0938 1.000 0.0723 0.3507 100.0 
1988 1395.90 0.2363 0.0971 1.018 0.0637 0.3907 103.9 
1989 1374.00 0.2422 0.0926 1.033 0.0697 0.3753 108.5 
1990 1364.50 0.2703 0.0932 1.048 0.0826 0.3792 113.3 
a. millions of hours. 
b. average hourly compensation (current dollars). 
c. millions of 1987 dollars. 
d. current dollars/1987 dollars. 
e. millions of current dollars. 
ji: 
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